Readings in Affective Education by Helms, Ronald G., Ph.D. & Strong, Gerald G.
Wright State University 
CORE Scholar 
Books Authored by Wright State Faculty/Staff 
1981 
Readings in Affective Education 
Ronald G. Helms Ph.D. 
Wright State University - Main Campus, ronald.helms@wright.edu 
Gerald G. Strong 
Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/books 
 Part of the Education Commons 
Repository Citation 
Helms , R. G., & Strong , G. G. (1981). Readings in Affective Education. Dayton, OH: University of Dayton 
Press. 
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by CORE Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Books 
Authored by Wright State Faculty/Staff by an authorized administrator of CORE Scholar. For more information, 
please contact library-corescholar@wright.edu. 
READINGS 
IN 
AFFECTIVE 
EDUCATION 
editors 
Ronald G. Helms Gerald Strong 
Kettering City Schools Xenia City Schools 
University of Dayton Press 
Dayton, Ohio 
© Copyright 1981 Ronald G. Helms 
READINGS 
IN 
AFFECTIVE 
EDUCATION 
editors 
Ronald G. Helms Gerald Strong 
Kettering City Schools Xenia City Schools 
University of Dayton Press 
Dayton, Ohio 
D Copyright 1981 Ronald G . Helms 
ABOUT THE EDITORS 
Ronald G. Helms, of Centerville, Ohio, earned a B.S. from 
Fairmont State College, West Virginia, an M.A. from the University 
of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio, and a Ph.D. from Ohio State University, 
Columbus, Ohio. He has instructed in the Kettering City Schools, 
Sinclair Community College, Wright State University and the Uni­
versity of Dayton. 
Dr. Helms has conducted a number of conferences on Cognitive 
Moral Development and Values Clarification and has written a 
number of articles in this area. In his work, he is promoting the 
incorporation of affective education into the curriculum at the 
elementary, secondary and collegiate levels of instruction. 
Gerald Strong, of Kettering, Ohio, earned the B.S. and M.S. 
degrees at eastern Kentucky University, Richmond, Kentucky, and 
an Ed.D degree at Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. Dr. 
Strong has taught elementary, junior high, and senior high school 
as well as university courses. He is presently employed as a 
curriculum consultant for the Xenia City Schools, Xenia, Ohio. 
Dr. Strong has conducted numerous workshops on values clarifica­
tion. He is concerned about the humanistic attitudes in our 
society and what our schools can do to improve them. 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
About The Editors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . • . • . . . . . ii 
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v 
Values On Education 
Gerald Strong 
1 
What Is Valuing? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . 
Nicholas Rescher 
4 
Toward A Modern Approach To Values: 
The Valuing Process In The Mature Person 
Carl B. Rogers 
7 
Helping Children To Clarify Values 
Louise E. Raths and Sidney B. 
..............•........ 
Simon 
26 
Values Education: What 
William E. Collie 
Lies Behind The Ballyhoo? 33 
Do Values Change? Yes! 
Re-evaluation Of Old Values 
Ronald Mazus 
39 
Do Values Change? No! 
Values As A Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
David R. Mace 
42 
Do We Need Moral Education? 
Ronald G. Helms 
45 
The Teacher Faces A Dilemma: 
A Moral Development Strategy For Students................ 
William E. Collie and Ruth B. Schumacher 
52 
iii 
The Cognitive-Developmental Approach To 
Moral Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 
Lawrence Kohlberg 
A Reply To Kohlberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 
Richard S. Peters 
Exp 
re 
co 
af 
re 
ed 
Th 
ma 
In 
pu 
te 
th, 
va 
va 
we 
tr, 
ga1 
COi 
SOI 
an< 
ca· 
thi 
ye, 
aw, 
er, 
Kol 
me, 
si: 
edi 
edi 
me1 
Mar 
pre 
one 
iv 
54 
77 
PREFACE 
Exploring, Deciding and Acting is a result of many, many hours of 
reading, studying and teaching. The editors have instructed 
courses and workshops which required a theoretical explanation of 
affective education. This text is our attempt to present some 
representative and excellent articles in the areas of affective 
education. 
Many values clarification lessons are being published. 
These may take the form of strategy books to elaborate kits. As 
materials proliferate, more and more teachers will gain access. 
In one sense this overabundance of materials can serve a useful 
purpose. However, the editors are concerned that well-meaning 
teachers and administrators may do as much harm as good unless 
there is first some degree of comprehension of an approach to 
values analysis and moral education. 
It is the writers' contentions that moral education and 
values clarification is not just another bandwagon. As educators 
we have a responsibility to keep abreast of current curriculum 
trends; today, we must know something about behavioral objectives, 
gaming and simulation, interaction analysis, role playing, inquiry, 
concepts, generalizations, and reflection. We should also know 
something of the theoretical constructs of values clarification 
and moral education. 
We would maintain that moral education and values clarifi­
cation are going to become much more important in all areas of 
the curriculum. As such these concepts have existed for several 
years. Perhaps John Dewey's writings in the 1890's did much to 
awaken the present generation to the need. During the past sev­
eral years such writers as Hunt and Metcalf, Jewett, Simon, 
Kohlberg and Piaget, have contributed much to curriculum develop­
ment. It is our contention that moral education and values analy­
sis ought to be of central concern to the curriculum. Values 
education is the most important kind of education. 
Nationwide we are witness to a growing trend of training 
educators in the skills of moral education. Many education 
method courses are beginning to deal with this complex issue. 
Many special workshops are being offered. Thus a need exists to 
provide a background for this new curriculum area. This book is 
one such attempt at filling this vacuum. 
R.G. Helms G. Strong 
Centerville, Ohio Kettering, Ohio 
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VALUES EDUCATION 
by 
Gerald Strong 
(Reprinted by permission from Affective Education, 
1974, pp. 59-60.) 
Values are a part of the larger trend in education more 
commonly referred to as "humanistic," "affective," "confluent," 
or "psychological" education. 
Humanistic education emphasized the non-academic aspects 
of a student's growth and development. The humanistic approach 
to education aims chiefly at promoting positive self-concepts, 
increasing achievement motivation, promoting creative thinking 
and behavior, fostering better human relations and clarifying 
values. 
Our values are of utmost importance. It is our values that 
determine the choices we make and the direction we take in life. 
In our highly complexed, individualized society, we are 
constantly bombarded by numerous decisions. Today people are 
confronted with more choices than ever before. In Future Shock 
Alvin Toffler warns that future generations may be faced with the 
dilemma of overchoice. A person who has no value system or a 
confused value system may not be able to cope with the dilemma of 
overchoice. Therefore, it appears imperative that each individual 
be assisted in establishing a set of values by which he can make 
rational decisions in unfamiliar situations. 
We may feel that we have a well defined set of values, only 
to realize that when we are faced with a novel situation or a 
forced choice between two or more agreeable or disagreeable alter­
natives that we become thoroughly confused. 
The concept of values education is not new. There have 
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always been parents and educators who have searched for ways to 
assist the youth in constructing a system of values. Numerous ap­
proaches may be used in constructing values. In their attempt 
to assist the younger generation in developing values, parents 
and educators have traditionally used such approaches as modeling, 
moralizing, laissez-faire and values clarification. 
The adults who use the modeling approach, at tempt to set a 
living example for youth to follow. This approach required the 
adult to set examples in words and in actions as well as in dress 
etc. The difficulty with this approach is that our youth of to­
day are exposed to so many different adults that it is difficult 
for them to select an appropriate model. 
Moralizing is an indoctrinational approach to teaching 
values. With the moralizing approach, the adults assume that 
they know the "right" set of values that everyone should have. 
The problem with this approach is that it has become ineffective. 
In our pluralistic society, the youth of today are introduced to 
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many different philosophies. The youth become confused. In the 
final analysis, they are left alone to make their own decisions 
about whose advice to follow or values to adopt. The youth who 
are reared by adults who use the moralizing approach in teaching 
values are not equipped to make rational choices. They have not 
had the experiences of selecting what they think is best and re­
frain from the "less desirable" values which others are en­
couraging them to adopt. 
The laissez-faire approach to values education requires 
everybody to refrain from teaching values. The adults who adopt 
this approach feel that everyone must develop their own values 
without any assistance. They feel that everyone will be allright 
in the end. 
The fallacy of the laissez-faire approach is that every­
thing usually does not come out allright in the end. Our youth 
of today do not need parents and teachers to run their lives, but 
they do need, and in most instances, want assistance in learning 
how to make value judgments. 
Values clarification is a process approach to helping people 
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to develop a system of values . The process of values clarification 
attempts to assist people in developing their own system of values. 
This process allows a person to learn about himself, to hecome 
aware of his beliefs, attitudes, feelings, and what it is he values. 
Values clarification does not provide anyone with a set of values, 
but rather allows a person to discover his own values. The adults 
who use the process of values clarification are not concernedwith 
the values a per s on holds, but rather the process by which a per­
son develops his value system. 
The questions that a person must ask to determine his own 
values stem from the areas of prizing, choosing and acting. By 
prizing, a person selects the beliefs, behavior and attitudes 
that he prizes and cherishes and is willing to publicly affirm 
when appropriate. In the process of choosing, the person must 
have a free choice to select from alternatives after the consid­
eration of the consequences of each alternative. By acting, a 
person must decide if he is to act the way he believes. A person 
should form a pattern, be consistent and repetitious in his ac­
tions. 
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who If a person cannot select what he prizes, make a choice be­
tween alternatives with a knowledge of the consequences and take 
action on his beliefs with consistency, he does not have a value 
system. 
The goal of the process of values clarification is to assist 
people in applying the above processes of valuing in their every­
day lives; to assist people in applying these processes to the 
beliefs and behavior patterns they now hold and to those they are 
now developing. 
To achieve the goal of values clarification, educators must 
use techniques which will aid the youth of today in becoming aware 
of the beliefs they prize and would be willing to affirm publicly 
when appropriate. The educators mu s t use materials and techniques 
which encourage students to consider the alternatives of thinking 
and acting. The learners must be encouraged to consider the pros­
and-cons and the consequences of the different alternatives in 
reaching decisions . The teacher aids the learned in discovering 
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whether their beliefs correspond with their actions. If there is 
a gross discrepancy between the learner's stated beliefs and ac­
tions, the teacher attempts to assist the student in coordinating 
the two. 
Through simulation exercises, the teacher provides the 
learners an opportunity to work their way through life-like situ­
ations. The learners are encouraged to use these processes in 
everyday life. People only learn what they are allowed to do. 
An individual does not really understand a problem until he/she 
has worked his/her way through it. It is only when people are 
allowed to make their own decisions and evaluate the consequences 
of the alternatives that they develop their own system of values. 
WHAT IS VALUING? 
by 
Nicholas Rescher 
(Reprinted by permission from Penny's Forum, 
Spring/Summer 1972, p. 3.) 
Man is a creature that not only does things but thinks about 
what he does. Accordingly, we do things for reasons-because we 
regard them as leading to certain benefits for ourselves or 
others. Values represent the ultimate reasons people have for 
acting as they do-their basic aims, objectives, aspirations, 
ideals. They cover the whole domain or rational human action and 
range from our lowest to our most elevated concerns. The little 
things in life-the good manners and ordinary politeness of social 
interaction-manifest values no less sharply than the big crises. 
Values are intangibles in the final analysis, they are 
things of the mind that have to do with the vision people have of 
"the good life" for themselves and their fellows. Each of aper­
son's values-be it "loyalty'' or "economic justice" or "self­
aggrandizement"-plays a role in his concept of human well-being 
by providing a standard by which he assesses the extent of his 
4 
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satisfactions in and with life. Abstract in character, these 
values manifest themselves concretely in the ways in which 
people talk and act, and especially in the pattern of their ex­
penditure of time and effort, in their actions at work and leisure 
and in their choices in the marketplace. It is primarily through 
these concrete manifestations that values secure their importance 
and relevance in human affairs. 
Values have to do with the rationalization of behavior-its 
justification and its explanation. Precisely because these two 
key factors of action and rationalizationcanget out of line, we 
come to the problem of the hypocrite; the person who verbally sub­
scribes to a value but violates it in action. Since we tend to 
prize authenticity in our fellows nothing "turns us off" faster 
toward someone than this form of hypocrisy-talking a value up 
without implementing it in action. 
Values are worth bothering with because they make a differ­
ence. When we know someone's values we are able to grasp "what 
makes him tick." We are better able to understand him and to 
deal with him. The possession of diverse values set people apart 
and shared values simplify their working together. 
As biological organism all men share certain basic values 
relating to the maintenance of life, values enshrined in thet 
rules of all civilized societies. But, of course, social and 
personal variation makes for a wide divergence in human values. 
Values can change. When this happens-when changes in the 
conditions of life are such as to cast from the pedestal of the 
true and genuine some heretofore accepted value that once be­
longed there, there lies before us a (Nietzche-reminiscent) 
''transvaluation" of values. But, of course, to say this is not 
to deny that it is unlikely to the point of inconceivability that 
many of our historic social or personal values-"justice," "in­
telligence," and "kindness," to give just three examples-could,f 
ever, under any realistically foreseeable circumstances, are 
likely ever to be dethroned. 
Why bother to clarify our values? Knowing our own values 
is a crucial part of learning about ourselves. What sorts of 
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things are really meaningful to us? What are we striving for 
and working towards? What sort of a world do we want to see 
come into being? To the extent that we cannot answer such ques­
tions we have failed to come to terms with ourselves. The mark 
of an immature person lies exactly here, in that he still "has a 
great deal to learn about himself." 
The single most important fact about values is that they 
themselves can be evaluated in turn. There are good values and 
bad values-curel or callous or self-aggrandizing values and 
those that are cooperative or kindly or humane. 
It is especially important to equip children with a "sense 
of values." They must not only have values (that is pretty well 
inevitable) but should have an intelligent attitude towards 
them. Not only should they be taught good values, but they 
should learn to be critically aware of their own values and of 
the need to keep their actual life-style properly attuned to 
them. 
The big values in our lives are called ideals . The impor­
tance of having them cannot be exaggerated. They are the basis 
of vision and aspiration in our lives. As the popular song put 
it, if you don'e have a dream you can't make a dream come true. 
In the kingdom of nature, man alone has a capacity for spiritual 
growth-for becoming bigger than life-size. All significant hu­
man achievement, great and small, is the product of intelligence 
guided by the vision of an ideal. 
Whether we choose to confront it or not, all of us face the 
basic question: What really are my values? It is well worth 
reflecting about. For it is close to impossible to come away 
from such reflection without an enhanced understanding of our­
selves and our relationship with our fellows. 
6 
TOWARD 
A MODERN APPROACH TO VALUES: 
THE VALUING PROCESS IN 
THE MATURE PERSON 
by 
Carl R. Rogers 
(Reprinted by permission from Paul Kurtz, ed., 
Moral PI'obZems in Contemporary Society, 
Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1969, pp. 77-95.) 
There is a great deal of concern today with the problems 
of values. Youth, in almost every country, is deeply uncertain 
of its value orientation; the values associated with various re­
ligions have lost much of their influence; sophisticated indi­
viduals in ever y culture seem unsure and troubled as to the 
goals they hold in esteem. The reasons are not far to seek. 
The world culture, in all its aspects, seems increasingly sci­
entific and relativistic, and the rigid, absolute views onvalues 
which come to us from the past appe ar anachronistic. Evenmore 
important, perhaps, is the fact that the modern individual is 
assailed from every angle by diverg e nt and contradictory value 
claims. It is no longer possible, as it was in the not too dis­
tant historical past, to settle comfortably into the value sys­
tem of one's community and live out one's life without ever ex­
amining the nature and the assumptions of that system. 
In this situation it is not surprising that value orien­
tations from the past appear to be in a state of disintegration 
or collapse. Men question whether there are, or can be, any 
universal values. It is often felt that we may have lost, in 
our modern world, all possibility of any general or cross-cul­
tural basis for values. One natural result of this uncertainty 
and confusion is that there is an increasing concern about, in­
terest in, and a searching for a sound or meaningful value ap­
proach which can hold its own in today 's world. 
I share this general concern. I have also experienced the 
mor e specific value issues which arise in my own field, psycho­
therapy. The client's feelings and convictions about values 
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f requently change during therapy. How can he or we knowwhether 
they have changed in a sound direction? Or does he simply, as 
some claim, take over the value system of his therapist? Is 
psychotherapy simply a device whereby the unacknowledged and un­
examined values of the therapist are unknowingly transmitted to 
an unsuspecting client? Or should this transmission of values 
be the therapist's openly held purpose? Should he become the mod­
ern priest, upholding and imparting a value system suitable for 
today? And what would such a value system be? There has been 
much discussion of such issues, ranging from thoughtful and em­
1pirically based presentations such as that of Glad, to more pol­
emic statements. As is so often true, the general problemfaced 
by the culture is painfully and specifically evident in the cul­
tural microcosm which is called the therapeutic relationship . 
I should like to attempt a modest approach to this whole 
problem. I have observed changes in the approach to values as 
the individual grows from infancy to adulthood. I observe fur­
ther changes when, if he is fortunate, he continues to grow to­
ward true psychological maturity. Many of these observations 
grow out of my experience as a therapist, where I have had the 
rich opportunity of seeing the ways in which individuals move to­
ward a richer life. From these observations I believe I see some 
directional threads emerging which might offer a new concept of 
the valuing process, more tenable in the modern world. I have 
made a beginning by presenting some of these ideas partially in 
2previous writings, I would like now to voice them more clearly 
and more fully. 
I would stress that my vantage point for making these ob-
servations is not that of the scholar or philosopher: I am 
speaking from my experience of the functioning human being, as 
have lived with him in the intimate experience of therapy, and 
in other situations of growth, change, and development. To me 
these seem to express some core human values which a humanistic 
ethics can support with confidence. 
Some Definitions 
Before I present some of these observations, perhaps I 
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I 
should try to clarify what I mean by values. There are many defi­
ne 
I 
C 
nitions which have been used, but I have found helpful some dis­
tinctions made by Charles Morris. He points out that value is a 
term we employ in different ways. We use it to refer to the ten­
dency of any living beings to show preference, in their actions, 
for one kin of object or objective rather than another. This 
preferential behavior he calls "operative values." It need not 
involve any cognitive or conceptual thinking. It is simply the 
value choice which is indicated behaviorally when the organism 
selects one object, rejects another. When the earthworm, placed 
in a simple Y maze, chooses the smooth arm of the Y instead 
of the path which is paved with sandpaper, he is indicating an 
operative value. 
A second use of the term might be called "conceived values." 
This is the preference of the individual for a symbolized object. 
Usually in such a preference there is anticipation or foresight 
of the outcome of behavior directed toward such a symbolized ob­
ject. A choice such as "honesty is the best policy" is such a 
conceived value. 
A final use of the term might be called "objective value." 
People use the word in this way when they wish to speak of what 
is objectively preferable, whether or not it is in fact sensed or 
conceived of as desirable. What I have to say involves this last 
definition scarcely at all. I will be concerned with operative 
values and conceptualized values. 
The Infant's Way of Valuing 
Let me first speak about the infant. The living human be­
ing has, at the outset, a clear approach to values. He prefers 
some things and experiences, and rejects others. We can infer 
from studying his behavior that he prefers those experiences 
which maintain, enhance, or actualize his organism, and rejects 
those which do not serve this end. Watch him for a bit: 
Hunger is negatively valued. His expression of this 
often come through loud and clear. 
Food is positively valued. But when he is satisfied, food 
is negatively valued, and the same milk he responded to 
so eagerly is now spit out, or the breast which seemed so 
satisfying is now rejected as he turns his head away from 
9 
the nipple with an amusing facial expression of disgust 
and revulsion. 
He values security, and the holding and caressing which 
seem to communicate security. 
He values new experience for its own sake, and we observe 
this in his obvious pleasure in discovering his toes, in 
his searching movements, in his endless curiosity. 
He shows a clear negative valuing of pain, bitter tastes, 
sudden loud sounds. 
All of this is commonplace, but let us look at these faces 
in terms of what they tell us about the infant's approach to 
values. It is first of all a flexible, changing, valuing pro­
cess, not a fixed system. He likes food and dislikes the same 
food. He values security and rest, and rejects it for new ex­
perience. What is going on seems best described as an organis­
mic valuing process, in which each element, each moment of what 
he is experiencing is somehow weighed, and selected or rejected, 
depending on whether, at that moment, it tends to actualize the 
organism or not. This complicated weighing of experience is 
clearly an organismic, not a conscious or symbolic function. 
These are operative, not conceived values. But this process can 
nonetheless deal with complex value problems. I would remind you 
of the experiment in which young infants had spread in front of 
them a score or more of dishes of natural (that is, unflavored) 
foods. Over a period of time they clearly tended to value the 
foods which enhanced their own survival, growth, and development. 
If for a time a child gorged himself on starches, this would soon 
be balanced by a protein "binge." If at times he chose a diet 
deficient in some vitamin, he would later seek out foods rich in 
this very vitamin. He was utilizing the wisdom of the body in 
his value choices, or perhaps more accurately, the physiological 
choices. 
Another aspect of the infant's approach to value is that 
the source or locus of the evaluating process is clearly within 
himself. Unlike many of us, he knows what he likes and dislikes, 
and the origin of these value choices lies strictly within him­
self. He is the center of the valuing process, the evidence for 
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his choices being supplied by his own senses. He is not at this 
point influenced by what his parents think he should prefer, or 
by what the church says, or by the opinion of the latest "expert" 
in the field, or by the persuasive talents of an advertising firm. 
It is from within his own experiencing that his organism is saying 
in the nonverbal terms- "This is good for me," "That is bad for 
me," "I like this," "I strongly dislike that." He would laugh 
at our concern over values, if he could understand it. Howcould 
anyone fail to know what he liked and disliked, what was good 
for him and what was not? 
The Change in the Valuing Process 
What happens to this highly efficient, soundly based valuing 
process? By what sequence of events do we exchange it for the 
more rigid, uncertain, inefficient approach to values which char­
acterizes most of us as adults? Let me try to state briefly one 
of the major ways in which I think this happens. 
The infant needs love, wants it, tends to behave in ways 
which will bring a repetition of this wanted experience. But 
this brings complications. He pulls baby sister's hair, and 
finds it satisfying to hear her wails and protests. He then 
hears that hs is "a naughty, bad boy," and this may be reinforced 
by a slap on the hand. He is cut off from affection. As this 
experience is repeated, and many, many others like it, he grad­
ually learns that what "feels good" is often "bad" in the eyes 
of others. Then the next step occurs, in which he comes to take 
the same attitude toward himself which these others have taken. 
Now, as he pulls his sister's hair, he solemnly intones, "Bad, 
bad boy." He is introjecting the value judgment of another, 
taking it in as his own. To that degree he loses touch with his 
own organismic valuing process. He has deserted the wisdom of 
his organism, giving up the locus of evaluation, and is trying 
to behave in terms of values set by another, in order to hold 
love. 
Or take another example at an older level. A boy senses, 
though perhaps not consciously, that he is more loved and prized 
by his parents when he thinks of being a doctor than when he 
11 
thinks of being an artist. Gradually he introjects the values 
attached to being a doctor. He comes to want , above all, to be 
a doctor. Then in college he is baffled by the fact that he re­
peatedly fails in chemistry, which is absolutely necessary to 
become a physician, in spite of the fact that the guidance coun­
selor assures him he has the ability to pass the course. Only 
in counseling interviews does he begin to realize how completely 
he has lost touch with his organismic reactions, how out of 
touch he is with his own valuing process. 
Let me give another instance from a class of mine, a group 
of prospective teachers. I asked them at the beginning of the 
course, "Please list for me the two or three values which you 
would most wish to pass on to the children with whom you will 
work." They turned in many value goals, but I was surprised by 
some of the items. Several listed such things as "to speak 
correctly," "to use good English, not to use words like ain't . " 
Others mentioned neatnese--"to do things according to instruc­
tions"; one explained her hope that "When I tell them to write 
their names in the upper right-hand corner with the date under 
it, I want them to do it that way, not in some other form". 
I confess I was somewhat appalled that for some of these 
girls the most important values to be passed on to pupils were 
to avoid bad grammar, or meticulously to follow teacher's in­
structions. I felt baffled. Certainly these behaviors had not 
been experienced as the most satisfying and meaningful elements 
in their own lives. The listing of such values could only be 
accounted for by the fact that these behaviors had gained~­
proval-and thus had been introjected as deeply important. 
Perhaps these several illustrations will indicate that in 
an attempt to gain or hold love, approval, esteem, the indi­
vidual relinquishes the locus of evaluation which was his in in­
fancy, and places it in others. He learns to have a basic dis­
trust for his own experiencing as a guide to his behavior. He 
learns from others a large number of conceived values, and adopts 
them as his own, even though they may be widely discrepant from 
what he is experiencing. Because these concepts are not based 
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on his own valuing, they tend to be fixed and rigid, rather 
than fluid and changing. 
Some Introjected Patterns 
It is in this fashion, I believe, that most of us accumu-
late the introjected value patterns by which we live. In this 
fantastically complex culture of today, the patterns we intro­
ject as desirable or undesirable come from a variety of sources 
and are often highly contradictory in their meanings. Let me 
list a few of the introjections which are common held. 
Sexual desires and behaviors are mostly bad. The sources 
of this construct are many-parents, church, teachers. 
Disobedience is bad. Here parents and teachers combine 
with the military to emphasize this concept. To obey is 
good. To obey without question is even better. 
Making money is the highest good. The sources of this con­
ceived value are too numerous to mention. 
Learning an accumulation of scholarly facts is highly 
desirable. 
Browsing and aimless exploratory reading for fun is 
undesirable. 
The source of these last two concepts is apt to be the 
school, the educational system. 
Abstract art is good. Here the people we regard as sophis­
tacted are the originators of the value. 
Communism is utterly bad. Here the government is a major 
source. 
To love thy neighbor is the highest good. This concept 
comes from the church, perhaps from the parents. 
Cooperation and teamwork are preferable to acting alone. 
Here companions are an important source. 
Cheating is clever and desirable. The peer group again 
is the origin. 
Coca-colas, chewing gum, electric refrigerators, andauto­
mobiles are all utterly desirable. This conception comes 
not only from advertisements, but is reinforced by people 
all over the world. From Jamaica to Japan, from Copen­
hagen to Kowloon, the "Coca-Cola culture" has come to be 
regarded as the acme of desirability. 
This is a small and diversified sample of the myriads of 
conceived values which individuals often introject, and hold as 
their own, without ever having considered their inner organismic 
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reactions to these patterns and objects. 
Common Characteristics of Adult Valuing 
I believe it will be clear from the foregoing that the 
usual adult- I feel I am speaking for most of us - has an ap­
proach to values which has these characteristics: 
The majority of his values are introjected from other 
individuals or groups significant to him, but are 
regarded by him as his own. 
The source or locus of evaluation on most matters lies 
outside of himself. 
The criterion by which his values are set is the degree 
to which they will cause him to be loved or accepted. 
These conceived preferences are either not related 
at all, or not clearly related, to his own process 
of experiencing. 
Often there is a wide and unrecognized discrepancy be­
tween the evidence supplied by his own experience and 
these conceived values. 
Because these conceptions are not open to testing in 
experience, he must hold them in a rigid and unchang-
ing fashion. The alternative would be a collapse of 
his values. Hence his values are "right" - like the 
law of the Medes and the Persians, which changeth not. 
Because they are untestable, there is no ready way of solv-
ing contradictions. If he has taken in from the community the 
conception that money is the summum bonum and from the church 
the conception that love of one's neighbor is the highest value, 
he has no way of discovering which has more value for him. 
Hence a common aspect of modern life is living with absolutely 
contradictory values. We calmly discuss the possibility of drop­
ping a hydrogen bomb on Russia, but then find tears in our eyes 
when we see headlines about the suffering of one small child. 
Because he has relinquished the locus of evaluation to 
others, and has lost touch with his own valuing process, he feels 
profoundly insecure and easily threatened in his values. If some 
of these conceptions were destroyed, what would take their 
place? This threatening possiblity makes him hold his value con­
ceptions more rigidly or more confusedly, or both. 
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The Fundamental Discrepancy 
I believe that this picture of the individual, with values 
mostly introjected held as fixed concepts, rarely examined or 
tested, is the picture of most of us. By taking over the con­
ceptions of others as our own, we lose contact with thepotential 
wisdom of our own functioning, and lost confidence in ourselves. 
Since these value constructs are often sharply at variance with 
what is going on in our own experiencing, we have in a very basic 
way divorced ourselves from ourselves, and this accounts for 
much of modern strain and insecurity. This fundamental discrep­
ancy between the individual's concepts and what he is actually 
experiencing, between the intellectual structure of his values 
and the valuing process going on unrecognized within him- this 
is a part of the fundamental estrangement of modern man from him­
self. This is a major problem for the therapist. 
Restoring Contact with Experience 
Some individuals are fortunate in going beyond the picture 
I have just given, developing further in the direction of psycho­
logical maturity. We see this happen in psychotherapy where we 
endeavor to provide a climate favorable to the growth of a per­
son. We also see it happen in life, whenever life provides a 
therapeutic climate for the individual. Let me concentrate on 
this further maturing of a value approach as I have seen it in 
therapy. 
In the first place, let me say somewhat parenthetically 
that the therapeutic relationship is not devoid of values. 
Quite the contrary. When it is most effective, it seems to me, 
it is marked by one primary value; namely, that this person, 
this client, has worth. He as a person is valued in his sep­
arateness and uniqueness. It is when he senses and realizes 
that he is prized as a person that he can slowly begin to value 
the different aspects of himself. Most importantly, he can be­
gin to value the different aspects of himself. Most importantly, 
he can begin, with much difficulty at first, to sense and to 
feel what is going on within him, what he is feeling, what he is 
experiencing, how he is reacting. He uses his experiencing as 
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a direct reference to which he can turn in forming accurate con­
ceptualizations and as a guide to his behavior. Gendlin has 
3elaborated the way in which this occurs. As his experiencing 
becomes more and more open to him, as he is able to live more 
freely in the process of his feelings, then significant changes 
begin to occur in his approach to values. It begins to assume 
many of the characteristics it had in infancy. 
Introjected Values in Relation to Experiencing 
Perhaps I can indicate this by reviewing a few of the brief 
examples of introjected values which I have given, and suggest­
ing what happens to them as the individual comes closer to what 
is going on within him. 
The individual in therapy looks back and realizes, "But 
I enjoyed pulling my sister's hair-and that doesn't 
make me a bad person." 
The student failing chemistry realizes, as he gets close 
to his own experiencing-"I don't value being a doctor, 
even though my parents do; I don't like chemistry; I 
don't like taking steps toward being a doctor; and I am 
not a failure for having these feelings." 
The adult recognizes that sexual desires and behavior 
may be richly satisfying and permanently enriching in 
their consequences, or shallow and temporary and less th a n 
satisfying. He goes by his own experiencing, which does 
not always coincide with the social norms. 
He considers art from a new value approach. He says, 
"This picture moves me deeply, means a great deal to 
me. It also happens to be an abstraction, but that is 
not the basis for my valuing it." 
He recognizes freely that this communist book or person 
has attitudes and goals which he shares as well as ideas 
and values which he does not share. 
He realizes that at times he experiences cooperation 
as meaningful and valuable to him, and that at other 
times he wishes to be alone and act alone. 
Valuing in the Mature Person 
The valuing process which seems to develop in this more 
mature person is in some ways very much like that in the infant, 
and in some ways quite different. It is fluid, flexible, based 
on this particular moment, and the degree to which this moment 
is experienced as enhancing and actualizing. Values are not 
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held rigidly, but are continually changing. The painting which 
last year seemed meaningful now appears uninteresting, the way 
of working with individuals which was formerly experienced as 
good now seems inadequate, the belief which then seemed true is 
now experienced as only partly true, or perhaps false. 
Another characteristic of the way this person values ex­
perience is that it is highly differentiated, or as the semanti­
cists would say, extensional. As the members of my class of 
prospective teachers learned, general principles are not as use­
ful as sensitively discriminating reactions. One says, "With 
this little boy, I just felt I should be very firm, and he seemed 
to welcome that, and I felt good that I had been. But I'm not 
that way at all with the other children most of the time." She 
was relying on her experiencing of the relationship with each 
child to guide her behavior. I have already indicated, in going 
through the examples how much more differentiated are the indi­
vidual's reactions to what were previously rather solid mono­
lithic introjected value. 
In another way the mature individual's approach is like 
that of the infant. The locus of evaluation is again established 
firmly within the person. It is his own experience which pro­
vides the value information or feedback. This does not mean that 
he is not open to all the evidence he can obtain from other 
sources. But it means that this is taken for what it is- out­
side evidence-and is not as significant as his own reactions. 
Thus he may be told by a friend that a new book is very disap­
pointing. He reads two unfavorable reviews of the book. Thus 
his tentative hypothesis is that he will not value the book. 
Yet if he reads the book his valuing will be based upon the re­
actions it stirs in him, not on what he has been told byothers. 
There is also involved in this valuing process a letting 
oneself down into the immediacy of what one is experiencing, en­
deavoring to sense and to clarify all its complex meanings. I 
think of a client who, toward the close of therapy, when puz­
zled about an issue, would put his head in his hands and say, 
"Now what is it that I'm feeling? I want to get next to it. I 
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want to learn what it is." Then he would wait, quietly and 
patiently, trying to listen to himself, until he could discern 
the exact flavor of the feelings he was experienceing. He, like 
others, was trying to get close to himself. 
In getting close to what is going on within himself, the 
process is much more complex than it is in the infant. In the 
mature person it has much more scope and sweep, for there is in­
volved in the present moment of experiencing the memory traces 
of all the relevant learnings from the past. This moment has not 
only its immediate sensory impact, but it has meaning growing 
4out of similar experiences in the past. It has both the new 
and the old in it. So when I experience a painting of a person, 
my experiencing contains within it the learnings I have accumu­
lated from past meetings with paintings or persons, as well as 
the new impact of this particular encounter. Likewise the moment 
of experiencing contains, for the mature adult, hypothese about 
consequences. "I feel now that I would enjoy a third drink, but 
past learnings indicate that I may regret it in the morning." 
"It is not pleasant to express forthrightly my negative feeli gs 
to this person, but past experience indicates that in a conti u­
ing relationship it will be helpful in the long run." Past and 
future are both in this moment and enter into the valuing. 
I find that in the person I am speaking of (and here again 
we see a similarity to the infant) the criterion of the valuing 
process is the degree to which the object of the experience ac­
tualizes the individual himself. Does it make him a richer, 
more complete, more fully developed person? This may sound as 
though it were a selfish or unsocial criterion, but it does not 
prove to be so, since deep and helpful relationships with others 
are experienced as actualizing. 
Like the infant, too, the psychologically mature adult 
trusts and uses the wisdom of his organism, with the difference 
that he is able to do so knowingly. He realizes that if he can 
trust all of himself, his feelings and his intuitions may be 
wiser than his mind, that as a total person he can be more sen­
sitive and accurate than his thoughts alone. Hence he is not 
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afraid to say-"! feel that this experience (or this thing, or 
this direction) is good. Later I will probably know why I feel 
it is good." He trusts the totality of himself. 
It should be evident from what I have been saying that this 
valuing process in the mature individual is not an easy or simple 
thing. The process is complex, the choices often very perplexing 
and difficult, and there is no guarantee that the choice which is 
made will in fact prove to be self-actualizing. But because what­
ever evidence exists is available to the individual, and because 
he is open to his experiencing, errors are correctable. If this 
chosen course of action is not self-enhancing this will be sensed 
and he can make an adjustment or revision. He thrives on a max­
imum feedback interchange, and thus, like the gyroscopic compass 
on a ship, can continually correct his course toward his true 
goal of self-fulfillment. 
Some Propositions Regarding 
the Valuing Process 
Let me sharpen the meaning of what I have been saying by 
stating two propositions which contain the essential elements of 
this viewpoint. While it may not be possible to devise empiri­
cal testsof each proposition in its entirety, each is to some 
degree capable of being tested through the methods of science. 
I would also state that though the following propositions are 
stated firmly in order to give them clarity, I am actually ad­
vancing them as decidedly tentative hypotheses. 
1. There is an organismic base for an organized valuing 
process within the human individual. 
It is hypothesized that this base is s-omething the human 
being shares with the rest of the animate world. It is part of 
the functioning life process of any healthy organism. It is the 
capacity for receiving feedback information which enables the 
organism continually to adjust its behavior and reactions so as 
to achieve the maximum possible self-enhancement. 
2. This valuing process in the human being is effective 
in achieving self-enhancement to the degree that the 
individual is open to the experiencing which is going 
on within himself. 
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I have tried to give two examples of individuals who are 
close to their own experiencing: the tiny infant who has not 
yet learned to deny in his awareness the processes going on with­
in; and the psychologically mature person who has relearned the 
advantages of this open state. 
There is a corollary to this second proposition which might 
be put in the following terms. One way of assisting the indi­
vidual to move toward openness to experience is through a rela­
tionship in which he is prized as a separate person, in which 
the experiencing going on within him is empathetically under­
stood and valued, and in which he is given the freedom to exper­
ience his own feelings and those of others without being threat­
ened in doing so. 
This corollary obviously grows out of therapeutic experience. 
It is a brief statement of the essential qualities in the thera­
peutic relationship. There are already some empirical studies, 
of which the one by Barrett-Lennard is a good example, which 
5gives support to such a statement. 
Propositions Reqardin~ 
fhe Outcome of the Valuing Process 
I come now to the nub of any theory of values or valuing. 
What are its consequences? I should like to move into this new 
ground by stating bluntly two propositions as to the qualities 
of behavior which emerge from this valuing process. I shall 
then give some of the evidence from my own experience as a thera­
pist in the support of these propositions. 
3. In persons who are moving toward greater openness to 
their experiencing, there is an organismic commonality 
of value directions. 
4. These common value directions are of such kinds as to 
enhance the development of the individual himself, of 
others in his community, and to make for the survival 
and evolution of his species. 
It has been a striking fact of my experience that in th r­
apy, where individuals are valued, where there is greater fre e ­
dom to feel and to be, certain value directions seem to emerg e . 
There are not chaotic directions but instead have a surprising 
commonality. This commonality is not dependent on the personality 
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of the therapist, for I have seen these trends emerge in the 
clients of therapists sharply different in personality. This 
commonality does not seem to be due to the influence of any one 
culture, for I have found evidence of these directions in cul­
tures as divergent as those of the United States, Holland, 
France, and Japan. I like to think that this commonality of 
value directions is due to the fact that we all belong to the 
same species- that just as a human infant tends, individually, 
to select a diet similar to that selected by other human infants, 
so a client in thereapy tends, individually, to choose value 
directions similar to those chosen by other clients. As a 
species there may be certain elements of experience which tend 
to make for inner development and which would be chosen by all 
individuals if they were genuinely free to choose. 
Let me indicate a few of these value directions as I see 
them in my clients as they move in the direction of personal 
growth and maturity. 
They tend to move away from facades. Pretense, defensive­
ness, putting up a front, tend to be negatively valued. 
They tend to move away from "oughts." The compelling feel­
ing of "I ought to do or be thus and so" is negatively valued. 
The client moves away from being what he "ought to be," no matter 
who has set that imperative. 
They tend to move away from meeting the expectations of 
others. Pleasing others, as a goal in itself, is negatively 
valued. 
Being real is positively valued, The client tends to move 
toward being himself, being his real feelings, being what he is. 
This seems to be a very~deep preference. 
Self-direction is positively valued. The client discovers 
an increasing pride and confidence in making his own choices, 
guiding his own life. 
One's self, one's own feelings come to be positively valued. 
From a point where he looks upon himself with contempt and des­
pair, the client comes to value himself and his reactions as be­
ing of worth, 
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Being a process is positively valued. From desiring some 
fixed goal, clients come to prefer the excitement of being a 
process of potentialities being born. 
Perhaps more than all else, the client comes to value an 
openness to all of his inner and outer experience. To be open to 
and sensitive to his own inner reactions and feelings, the re­
actions and feelings of others, and the realities of the objec­
tive world-this is a direction which he clearly prefers. This 
openness becomes the client's most valued resource. 
Sensitivity to others and acceptance of others is positively 
valued. The client comes to appreciate others for what they are, 
just as he has come to appreciate himself for what he is. 
Finally, deep relationships are positively valued. To 
achieve a close, intimate, real, fully communicative relation­
ship with another person seems to meet a deep need in every in­
dividual, and is very highly valued. 
These then are some of the preferred directions which I have 
observed in individuals moving toward personality maturity. 
~hough I am sure that the list I have given is inadequate and 
perhaps to some degree inaccurate, it holds for me exciting pos­
sibilities, let me try to explain why. 
I find it significant that when individuals are prized as 
persons, the values they select do not run the full gamut of 
possibilities. I do not find, in such a climate of freedom, that 
one person comes to value fraud and murder and thievery, while 
another values a life of self-sacrifice, and another values only 
money. Instead there seems to be a deep and underlying thread 
of commonality. I dare to believe that when the human being is 
inwardly free to choose whatever he deeply values, he tends to 
value those objects, experiences, and goals which make for his 
own survival, growth, and development, and for the survival and 
development of others. I hypothesize that it is characteristic 
of the human organism to prefer such actualizing and socialized 
goals when he is exposed to a growth-promoting climate. 
A corollary of what I have been saying is that in any cul­
ture, given a climate of respect and freedom in which he is 
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valued as a person, the mature individual would tend to choose 
and prefer these same value directions. This is a highly sig­
nificant hypothesis which could be tested. It means that though 
the individual of whom I am speaking would not have a consistent 
or even a stable system of conceived values, the valuing process 
within him would lead to emerging value directions which would 
be constant across cultures and across time. 
Another implication I see is that individuals who exhibit 
the fluid valuing process I have tried to describe, whose value 
directions are generally those I have listed, would be highly 
effective in the ongoing process of human evolution. If the 
human species is to survive at all on this globe, the human be­
ing must become more readily adaptive to new problems and situ­
ations, must be able to select that which is valuable for develop­
ment and survival out of new and complex situations, must be ac­
curate in his appreciation of reality if he is to make such se­
lections. The psychologically mature person as I have described 
him has, I believe, the qualities which would cause him to value 
those experiences which would make for the survival and enhance­
ment of the human race. He would be a worthy participant and 
guide in the process of human evolution. 
Finally, it appears that we have returned to the issue of 
universality of values, but by a different route. Instead of 
universal values "out there," or a universal value system imposed 
by some group-philosophers, rulers, or priests-we have the pos­
sibility of universal human value directions emerging from the 
experiencing of the human organism. Evidence from therapy in­
dicates that both personal and social values emerge as natural, 
and experienced, when the individual is close to his own organ­
ismic valuing process. The suggestion is that though modern man 
no longer trusts religion or science or philosophy nor any sys­
tem of beliefs to give him his values, he may find an organis­
mic valuing base within himself which, if he can learn again to 
be in touch with it, will prove to be an organized, adaptive and 
social approach to the perplexing value issues which face all of 
us. 
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Summary 
I have tried to present some observations, growing out of 
experience in psycho-therapy, which are relevant to man's search 
for some satisfying basis for his approach to values. 
I have described the human infant as he enters directly into 
an evaluating transaction with his world, appreciating or reject­
ing his experiences as they have meaning for his own actualiza­
tion, utilizing all the wisdom of his tiny but complex organism. 
I have said that we seem to lose this capacity for direct 
evaluation, and come to behave in those ways and to act in terms 
of those values which will bring us social approval, affection, 
esteem. To buy love we relinquish the valuing process. Because 
the center of our lives now lies in others, we are fearful and 
insecure, and must cling rigidly to the values we have intro­
jected. 
But if life or therapy gives us favorable conditions for 
continuing our psychological growth, we move on in something of 
a spiral, developing an approach to values which partakes of the 
infant's directness and fluidity but goes far beyond hi~ in its 
richness. In our transactions with experience we are again the 
locus or source of valuing, we prefer those experiences which in 
the long run are enhancing, we utilize all the richness of our 
cognitive learning and functioning, but at the same time we trust 
the wisdom of our organism. 
I have pointed out that these observations lead to certain 
basic statements. Man has within him an organismic bases for 
valuing. To the extent that he can be freely in touch with this 
v,aluing process in himself, he will behave in ways which are 
self-enhancing. We even know some of the conditions which en­
able him to be in touch with his own experienceing process. 
In therapy, such openness to experience leads to emerging 
value directions which appear to be common across individuals 
and perhaps even across cultures. Stated in older terms, indi­
viduals who are thus in touch with their experiencing come to 
value such directions as sincerity, independence, self-direction, 
self-knowledge, social responsibility, and loving interpersonal 
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relationships. 
I have concluded that a new kind of emergent universality 
of value directions becomes possible when individuals move in the 
direction of psychological maturity, or more accurately, move in 
the direction of becoming open to their experiencing. Such a 
value base appears to make for the enhancement of self and others, 
and to promote a positive evolutionary process. 
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HELPING CHILDREN TO CLARIFY VALUES 
by 
Louis E. Raths and Sidney B. Simon 
(Reprinted by permission from N. E. A. Journal , 
October 1967, pp. 12-15.) 
Modern life in the United States is rich with choices and 
opportunities, but it is also very confusing. It is far more dif­
ficult for a child to develop clear values today than it was in 
the simpler, more austere life of the turn of the century. 
One major reason for this is the change in the family, where 
many believe, values develop. In recent decades, Americans have 
seen dramatic, if not frightening, changes in the family - work­
ing mothers (one out of three), broken homes (estimated at one 
out of five), and geographic mobility (about one family in five 
moves every year). Family sharing has decreased. The consequence, 
we submit, has been a growing confusion in the life of children. 
When the family defaulted, society passed the buck to the 
schools. To avoid controversy, many schools began to stand for 
nothing. Teachers turned toward "teaching the facts." Adminis­
trators tended to prefer teachers who did not raise issues. In 
communities consisting of strangers with many different back­
grounds, it became easier to have schools which represented no 
moral consensus. 
The question we must answer today, then, is: What can 
schools in a heterogeneous society do in the teaching of values? 
Before arriving at an answer, it is necessary to define the terms 
and say not only what values are but by what processes people ac­
quire them. 
Individuals have experiences. Out of these may come cer­
tain general guides to behavior - values - which tend to give 
direction to life. Values evolve and mature as experiences 
evolve and mature. 
Because values are a part of living, they operate in very 
complex circumstances and usually involve more than simple 
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extremes of right and wrong, good and bad, true and false. The 
conditions in which values work t ypically involve conflicting 
demands, a weighing and balancing, and finally an action that re­
flects a multitude of forces. Since each person's experiences 
are different, we cannot be certain what values, what style of 
life, would be most suitable for any person. We do, however, 
have some ideas about what processes might be most effective for 
obtaining sound values. 
we see values as based on three processes: choosir.g, 
prizing and acting. From these we derive seven criteria, all of 
which must be satisfied if something is to be called value. An 
adult who wants to help children develop values should, we be­
lieve: 
Encourage children to make choices, and allow them to 
choose freely 
Help them discover and examine available alternatives 
when faced with choices 
Help them weigh alternatives thoughtfully, reflecting 
on the consequences of each 
Encourage them to consider what it is that they prize 
and cherish 
Give them opportunitiss to make public affirmations of 
their choices 
Encourage them to act in accordance with their choices 
Help them to examine repeated behaviors or patterns in 
their life. 
In this way the adult encourages the process of valuing. 
The intent of this process is to help children clarify for them­
selves what they value. This is very different from trying to 
fersuade children to accept some predetermined set of values by 
limiting their choices, enforcing rules and regulations, or 
teaching cultural or religious dogma, as some of the traditional 
approaches do. 
We have no doubt that such methods have in the past con­
trolled behavior and even formed beliefs and attitudes, but we 
assert that they have not and cannot lead to values in the sense 
we are concerned with them-values that represent the free and 
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thoughtful choice of intelligent humans interacting with complex 
and changing environments. 
The traditional approaches listed above would receive a 
low grade in terms of their effectiveness in promoting such values 
as honor, courage, self-control, and love. All have the air of 
indoctrination: free inquiry, thoughtfulness, and reason seem 
to be lost. The approach seems to be to persuade the child to 
adopt the "right" values rather than to help him develop a valu­
ing process. 
One reason for the continued use of the old methods is that 
no clear and testable alternative has been provided. We suggest 
an approach to clarifying values that rests on a specific method 
of responding to things a student says or does. The strategy, 
called clarifying response, is to respond to a student so that 
he considers what he has chosen, what he prizes, and/or what he 
is doing. 
The clarifying response is usually aimed at one student at 
a time, often in brief, informal conversations held in class, in 
hallways, on the playground, or anyplace else where a student 
does or says something to trigger such a response from the 
teacher. 
Especially ripe for clarifying responses are expressions by 
students of attitudes, aspirations, purposes, interests, acti­
vities, convictions, worries, and opinions. Typical keywords 
that signal a statement of attitudes include: I'm for, I'm 
against, I think, if you ask me, my choice is, my way of doing it 
is, I believe. 
As a teacher listens to students, he may mentally plus and 
minus their statements-plus for what they are for and minus for 
what they are against. Students are not always aware when they 
have revealed what they are for or against and are quite sur­
prised to see their inconsistencies. 
Teachers must avoid making students feel they will lose face 
as they expose their feelings. It is essential to maintain an 
accepting atmosphere and to say sincerely over-and-over again, 
"All of us are inconsistent from time to time, and all of us tend 
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to be confused about certain things we are for and against. One 
of the things we hope to learn is how to think about our atti­
tudes and clarify them." 
The purpose of the clarifying response is to raise ques­
tions in the mind of the student, to prod him gently to examine 
his life, his actions, and his ideas. The responses lead the 
student to no specific value; he does not need to deliver a 
"right" answer to a clarifying response. 
All of the exchanges will be brief, for an extended series 
of probes might give the student the feeling that he is being 
cross-examined and make him defensive. Also, a long exchange 
might give him too much to think about. The idea is to raise a 
few questions, leave them hanging in the air, and then move on 
without moralizing. The student to whom the questions are ad­
dressed, and others who might overhear, may well ponder them 
later. These gentle prods stimulate students, and our research 
indicates that a number of such exchanges add up and make large 
differences in some students' lives. 
Many of the responses will be geared directly to one of the 
seven valuing processes. For example, when choosing freely is 
involved, the teacher may ask, "Where do you suppose you first 
got that idea?" or "Are you the only one in your crowd that feels 
this way?" If the student has chosen from alternatives, the 
teacher may say, "What else did you consider before you picked 
this?" or "What's really good about this choice?" To help the 
student in choosing thoughtfully, the teacher may ask, "What 
would be the consequences of each alternative available?" or 
"What assumptions are involved in your choice?" 
If prizing and cherishing are involved, the teacher may ask, 
"How long have you wanted it?" or "In what way would life be dif­
ferent without it?" Another issue is whether the student is will­
ing to affirm publicly his choice-"Would you tell the class the 
way you feel sometime?" In reference to acting upon a choice, a 
a teacher may ask, "What are your first steps? Subsequent steps?" 
or "Have you examined the consequences of your act?'' Questions 
a teacher might ask in relation to the repeating of an action 
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include, "Have you felt this way for some time?" "Has it been 
worth the time and money?'' "How long do you think you will con­
tinue?" 
The following brief exchange shows how a teacher may use 
clarifying responses: 
MARY: Some day I'd like to join the Peace Corps. 
TEACHER: What are some good things about that, Mary? 
MARY: Oh, the chance to be of service excites me, and 
going to faraway places does too. 
TEACHER: Of those two, which is first? 
MARY: I guess the faraway places part. 
TEACHER: Are you glad that that one is first? 
MARY: No, I guess people would respect me more if the 
service part was first. 
TEACHER: Well, it's been interesting talking to you, 
Mary, but I must get back to my papers. 
Perhaps we can talk about it another time. 
Students are accustomed to having teachers ask questions, 
both academic-Who founded Jamestown?-and behavioral-Didn't I 
tell you to be quiet? These questions however, have nothing to 
do with the interchange between Mary and the teacher, with the 
clarifying approach which respects the individual's rights to 
make decisions. 
Because many questions teachers customarily ask are really 
statements of the teachers' decisions, students often assume that 
a question is actually a concealed directive. To combat this, 
the teacher begins to use clarifying questions at times when the 
student knows that the teacher is not trying to disapprove of 
what he is saying or doing. 
The simplest guide in the beginning is for the teacher 
to use clarifying responses in situations of which he either 
approves or has no preferences. After students become familiar 
with the clarifying responses, they will begin to use them on 
one another and on other friends. 
Before defining a clarifying response, it may be helpful to 
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say what it is not. 
Clarifying is not therapy. 
Clarifying is not used on students with serious 
emotional problems. 
Clarifying is not a single one-shot effort: it 
depends on a program consistently applied over a 
period of time. 
Clarifying avoids moralizing, preaching, indoc­
trinating, inculcating, or dogmatizing. 
Clarifying is not an interview, nor is it done in 
a formal manner. 
Clarifying is not meant to replace the teacher's 
other educational functions. 
Clarifying is an honest attempt to help a student look at 
his life and to encourage him to think about it in an atmosphere 
in which positive acceptance exists. Students will probably not 
enter into the perplexing process of clarifying values for them­
selves if they perceive that the teacher does not respect their 
viewpoint. If trust is not communicated, the student may well 
play the game, pretending to clarify and think and choose and 
prize but being as unaffected by the exchange as by a tiresome 
morality lecture. 
For many teachers, working with clarification of values 
will mean much less talking and a lot more listening. Teachers 
who are able to do this and to ask the right questions begin to 
have small miracles happening in their classrooms. They often 
see attendance go up, grades rise, and interest and excitement 
in learning crackle. They see encouraging changes in students 
who have been classified as apathetic, listless, and indifferent. 
The teacher fits the clarifying response into the value 
clarifying method by doing the following: first, looking and 
listening for statements or actions which suggest a value issue 
may be involved (he notes especially children who seem to bevery 
apathetic, indecisive, flighty, or inconsistent or who tend to 
overconform or drift from here to there without reason); second, 
keeping in mind the goal-youngsters who have clear, personal 
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values; third, responding to a value indicator with a clarifying 
question or comment designed to help the student use one or more 
of the seven valuing processes. 
Though a number of students may overhear a student-teacher 
exchange and profit from it, the clarifying response focuses on 
one student. Some techniques for value clarification can be used 
with a whole group. For example, a teacher may give each member 
of the class a value sheet which, in its simplest form, consists 
of a provocative statement and a series of questions. 
The purpose of the statement is to raise an issue that may 
have value implications. The purpose of the questions is to 
carry each student through the value clarifying process with that 
issue. Since valuing is an individual matter, each student com­
pletes the value sheet by himself. Later, his answers may be 
shared with the teacher or other students and/or used as a basis 
for large or small group discussions. 
Some value sheets consist of nothing more than a series of 
probing questions that are keyed to a common reading or experi­
ence. The questions on the value sheet are in the style of the 
valuing theory. That is, the questions do not try subtly to con­
vince a student to believe what the adult believes but to help 
him take the issue at hand through the value criteria. 
Among the many other classroom methods which a teacher may 
use to help children escape from value confusion are role-playing, 
devil's advocate (presenting the unpopular side of an issue ) , 
and time diary (each student keeps a record of how he spends his 
time and analyzes the record). 
How can a teacner begin to incorporate value clarifying 
into his teaching? We suggest that he start by working toward a 
classroom climate in which students feel they are respected and 
accepted and feel secure enough to think logically and speak 
honestly. At the same time, the teacher must work to eliminate 
his own tendencies to moralize. 
With valuing processes of choosing, prizing, and acting 
ever in mind, the teacher experiments, slowly but steadily, to 
find which strategies fit him and work best with his students. 
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In a few months he will be able to see results in the way his 
students make and act upon their choices. He may also find he 
has clarified some of his own values. 
VALUES EDUCATION: WHAT LIES BEHIND THE BALLYHOO? 
by 
William E. Collie 
Certainly no topic has received more attention in elemen­
tary and secondary school circles in recent years than values 
education. For cynics who, over the years, have seen educational 
interests come and go, the focus may be viewed as only educa­
tional ballyhoo, merely "sound and fury signifying nothing" 
which will ride the crest of popularity but, like many fads, 
soon be replaced by another emphasis (back to basics?) having 
made little real impact on the actual conduct of the school. A 
closer examination, however, suggests that values education, 
while it may lose its primacy as the "in" topic, has the poten­
tial for significantly influencing school practice. 
As evidence of the lively interest in values education, 
look at the educational literature of the last several years. 
Professional journals are running a continuing stream of articles 
and publishing special issues on values education/moral education 
and the various strategies and techniques developed including, 
most prominently, values clarification and moral development. 
Commercial publishers are spewing forth new curricular materials 
with a values emphasis (or discovering the values slant was 
there in the old stuff all along just needing to be publicized). 
Professional conferences from school in-service days to national 
conventions are offering innumerable section meetings on some 
aspect of values education. And to quench teachers' "how to do 
it" thirst, a number of paperbacks are appearing on educational 
bookshelves designed to help teachers develop instructional 
strategies for values education (e.g. Hawley, 1975; Hawley and 
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Hawley, 1975; Hawley, 
Kniker, 1977). 
In fact, so 
cation" that it is becoming 
Simon and Britton, 1973; Fraenkel. 1977; 
much is being done under the label "values edu­
increasingly difficult to sort 
through and make sense of the bombardment of varied conceptual 
approaches and curriculum materials now available. Douglas 
Superka and others (1975) have developed a typology of values 
education approaches that enables one to make some sense of what 
we refer to as "values education." First of all, they define 
terms which we will utilize: values are regarded as "criteria 
for determining levels of goodness, worth, or beauty," valuing 
refers to "the process of developing or actualizing values," 
and values education involves "the explicit attempt to teach 
about values and/or valuing." Superka and associates identified 
five commonly used approaches in values education including incul­
cation, moral development, analysis, clarification, and action 
learning. Within the five categories, 84 sets of curriculum 
materials were analyzed. In addition, they suggested two other 
approaches for which no existing curriculum materials could be 
identified. The evocation approach would "help students express 
their values as personal moral emotions without thought or hesi­
itation." The union approach would "help students perceive them­
selves and act not as separate egos but as parts of a larger, in­
terrelated whole." 
Utilizing Superka's categories, it appears that most of 
the discussion currently taking place about values and moral edu­
cation refers to approaches which deal with moral development 
strategies; values analysis with emphasis on development of 
rational, analytical skills; or values clarification approaches 
which stress identification of person values seen in the context 
of feelings and behavior patterns. The discussion of how values 
education ought to take place within these mainstream emphases 
has led to a lively debate among proponents of the differing ap­
proaches. Perhaps the most spirited interchange has related to 
the adequacy of values clarification or moral development as 
singular strategies for values education. 
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supporters of values clarification see values as based on 
the three processes of choosing, prizing, and acting which com­
bined collectively define valuing. The results of the process 
they call "values" (Raths, Harmin, Simon 1966). Advocates have 
developed a number of classroom strategies to facilitate the 
process of valuing (Simon, Howe, Kirschenbaum 1972; Simon 1974). 
Sidney Simon, the most active spokesman for the approach, en­
thusiastically claims that values clarification helps people to 
be more purposeful and productive to sharpen their critical think­
ing, and to have better relations with each other (Simon and de 
Sherbinin, 1975). 
Critics of the values clarification approach include 
Lawrence Kohlberg, who rejects the values clarification defini­
tion of the end of values education as self-awareness because of 
its derivation from a belief in ethical relativity (1975). John 
S . Stewart concurs, charging that values clarification is based 
on "a theory that is philosophically indefensible and psycholog­
ically inadequate" (1975). 
Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory of moral develop­
ment posits that people think about moral issues in six identi­
fiable stages. Morality is regarded as a natural product of a 
tendency toward empathy or role taking and is based on a univer­
sal concern for justice. Kohlberg's theory suggests the highest 
stage of moral reasoning is based on universal principles of 
justice (Kohlberg 1971, 1975; Fenton 1976, Beyer 1976). The 
moral development approach utilized with students incorporates 
peer discussion of value dilemmas to stimulate movement to the 
next stage of moral reasoning (Galbraith and Jones 1976; Hersh, 
Paolitto, Reimer 1979). 
Critics like Richard S. Peters (1975) attack Kohlberg's 
emphasis on morality based on a theory of justice as simplistic 
when it is viewed as the only form of morality. He criticizes 
Kohlberg for being so wrapped up in the justification for his 
own theory that he is ignoring other aspects of morality and 
moral learning and development which has been identified by 
other scholars working in the field. Jack Fraenkel (1971) points 
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out the limited scope of the moral dilemma discussion strategy 
based only on examination of student-generated action options. 
Fraenkel (1976) further questions the adequacy of the rationale 
behind the moral reasoning approach for values education. 
Fraenkel suggests that intellectual development must be coupled 
with emotional development if individuals are to be fully func­
tioning and psychologically whole persons. 
While an overarching, comprehensive values education theor y 
may be lacking, the debate between the specialists does not s e em 
to have had serious impact on educational practitioners•. 
Teachers at the elementary and secondary levels, and in teacher 
education as well, have adopted either or both approaches on 
pragmatic grounds -- the strategies are clearcut, easily mastered. 
adaptable to a variety of classroom settings, and enjoyed by the 
students. 
Values clarification and moral development approaches pro­
vide the classroom teacher with immediate reward. The rationale 
behind the approaches sounds plausible, and the teacher can feel 
comfortable getting involved in these kinds of moral/values exam­
ination which do not operate from a religious base. Both ap­
proaches relate to individual concerns of the students or to con­
cerns with which they can easily identify. Issues raised on the 
more personal level, even though they may be extended to more 
universal concerns, are much more satisfying than the values 
analysis approach, for example, which urges consideration of 
complex social issues that often appear to be too far removed 
from student life or to require too much knowledge for students 
to successfully use. In contrast to the inculcation approach, 
both values clarification and moral development approaches to 
values education remove the stigma of authoritarian values pro­
mulgator from the teacher role. 
Stronger than any curricular approach to values education 
which may be implemented in the existing structure of the 
schools may be the revision of the moral environment of the 
school itself, Kohlberg (1976) among others has argued that the 
true ''hidden curriculum" of the schools is the subtle, 
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unrecognized moral teaching of the school atmosphere, a curricu­
lum so potent that its force can overwhelm and make meaningless 
any new moral education approach imposed on it. 
Building on Kohlberg's premise that moral education 
grounded on a theory of justice is in actuality the proper basis 
for civic education, a number of pilot schools have been estab­
lished to test his "just community concept." Wasserman (1976) 
describes the establishment of a Cluster School within Cambridge 
(Massachusetts) High and Latin School. The school is composed 
of faculty and ninth to twelfth grade student volunteers enrolled 
in a core curriculum of English and social studies. The curric­
ulum centers on role taking, on moral discussions, and on re­
lating the governance structure of the school to the wider com­
munity. The rules and procedures are established by the com­
munity. Preliminary progress reports indicate a developing sense 
of community and higher morale. Research regarding progress in 
moral reasoning in this learning environment has just begun. 
Wasserman also reports two other school reorganization pro­
grams to fit the developmental model. In Brookline, Massachu­
setts, an existing school-within-a-school is establishing a demo-
cratic governance structure. In the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 
area Carnegie-Mellon University is working with three school 
districts and a private academy to develop Civic Education 
Schools or classes within the schools. Danforth Foundation sup-
port for all three programs will enable cooperative planning and 
information exchange. 
Attempts such as those described by Wasserman suggest that 
values education can have an impact far greater than any single 
approach. Returning to Superka's categories, these project 
schools appear to incorporate several approaches to values edu­
cation -- moral development, values analysis, values clarifica­
tion, and social action -- within a school structure in which 
the participants are able to more freely practice their moral 
and value choices. Such experiments can put the philosophical 
and developmental assumptions behind moral development theory to 
the ultimate test. 
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Values education seemingly has found an institutional home 
in the schools. However, it is now a melange of varied approach
based on differing goals and objectives and utilizing disparate 
strategies. For values education to have significant impact on 
the schools, the place of values education in the school setting
will have to be radically reconceptualized beyond merely being 
e: 
 
regarded as a new approach to be tacked onto or integrated with 
the existing curriculum. Further, serious examination of the 
social structure and the interactive patterns of the schools 
will be necessary if an environment conducive to moral growth 
is to exist. 
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DO VALUES CHANGE? YES! RE-EVALUATION OF OLD VALUES 
by 
Ronald Mazus 
(Reprinted by permission from Penny ' s FoY'Ul71, 
Spring/Summer, 1972, p. 16.) 
"Values" is an elusive concept. When used in a discussion 
or a presentation of ideas, the term often conveys comfort to 
the audience addressed, for, after all, we are all in favor of 
everyone having values, preferably our own. But what is judged 
to be significantly worthwhile in life varies from culture-to­
culture, society-to-society, person-to-person. The concept it­
self begs many questions and issues. One can tell more about a 
person's values in any given situation by what the person does 
rather than by what that person says. Yet, that statement it­
self begs a question: how can we always be sure of another's 
motivations and meanings? 
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It is one of my assumptions that all values are relative 
to at least three experienced facts: the sense of self (I­
ness); the existence of others; the environment of Nature. These 
three given aspects of reality are not created by me, but my 
perception of them and their continuously changing and complex 
interrelationship shapes them in part. For I bring to those ex­
periences my imagination, memory, wants, needs, attitudes, goals, 
knowledge, willing, beliefs, behavior, emotions, and biological 
inheritance. To some extent, each of us creates a personal and 
unique reality. 
It is our search for values-as-common-good which prevents 
our private realities from random clashing and mutual destruc­
tion. It is possible, of course, to go to either extreme of 
values-as-common-good: Political oppression, war and fanaticism 
when it is overstressed; psychosis or character pathology when 
it is understressed. There will always be stress between indi­
vidual freedom and social order, but this tension can be crea­
tive, especially in a society which allows and protects a plural­
ism of values. I am claiming then, that it is a social good-a 
value-for us to take seriously the pursuit of meaning-in-com­
munity in order to maximize both societal and individual well­
being. Indeed, I recognize and accept for myself a long list of 
values, virtues or goods (versus evils). I expend an extra­
ordinary amount of my time, emotional and intellectual resources, 
and psychic energy trying to actualize certain deeply held values 
which have to do with personal growth, group joy, and world com­
munity. 
However, even if I did believe that there are unchanging 
values in life and the universe, such a philosophical conviction 
would provide small comfort and little direction for me. I do 
not believe that there are values outside of persons which are 
initiated from a Platonic realm, or divinely revealed, or which 
are applicable to all persons and that valuing is a complex pro­
cess involving creation, risk and courage; values are not some­
thing you have but something you do. In other words, I hold 
values to be experiential and situational. We have a choice in 
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the worldview which we will choose as ours and act upon in 
spite of the awareness of the demonic potential of all ideal-
ogies. It is ours to evaluate, risk, decide and act. Every 
value is created the moment it is chosen, willed and expressed. 
Friendship, for example, is not a thing which exists between 
two people; it is a constantly changing relational dynamic which 
deepens or dies according to what each person brings to the other 
to share something of who they are at that time. And that iden­
tical constellation of evaluating, risking, deciding and acting 
may never again occur, leaving that particular moment of being 
and response unique. Though I may use past experiences, I never­
theless face "new occasions which teach new duties" and I am 
left in my aloneness to choose among my many value-concepts in 
order to contribute to any situation the most creative human re­
sponse of which I am capable. Most of the time, of course, I 
am not confronted with such momentous decision-making; habit, 
conditioning, character and personality help me, for better or 
for worse, in the quiet survival of each day. 
But the times certainly are numerous enough when I en­
counter experiences which require radical re-evaluation of old 
values. There are times to hold on to friends and times to let 
them go; times to endure suffering and times to fight it; times 
for passionate sex and times for gentle sensuality; times for 
disciplined reflection and times for controversial action; times 
for involvement and times for detachment; times to trust and 
times to withhold trust; times for privacy and times for open­
ness-in-community. And so we could go on and on, not merely 
imitating the rhetoric of Ecclesiastes, but being painfully 
aware of the paradoxes, absurdities, ironies, inconsistencies, 
and unpredictabilities of living which make us vulnerable to 
hurt and which make it imperative that somehow we find the 
courage to be in spite of all insecurities and anxieties. 
In our eagerness to hold on to old values in their old 
contexts we will find not security but cultural and personal 
stagnation. As the late Abraham Maslow expressed it (Easlen 
Papers, 1968), "the self-actualizing person, for the most part, 
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transcends the values of his culture." Religious and educa­
tional institutions which have responsibility for the nurture 
of youth and adults should embrace the potential of the future 
and prepare people to confront it not with shock but with con­
fidence based on emerging values-values which individuals should 
have the dignity to discover within themselves and through their 
own experiencing. 
The process of education is basically value-venturing, but 
institutions of education seem distrustful of the capacity and 
desire of learners to explore, discover, experiment, and create. 
Educators often seem more secure in the role of technicians of 
stereotyped truths and values rather than participating in an 
on-going valuing process. The quest for a hierarchy of values 
or a set of values is, I believe, misleading because it misses 
the more critical issue of developing the individual's ability 
to utilize value-making criteria in ever-changing contexts. 
Even a value framework at one maturational stage of a person 
will not be the same value framework of another maturational 
stage of that same individual. And, certainly, the values of 
the contemporary generation are not identical to those of its 
preceding generation, for new times bring new challenges which 
require new responses. The contemporary movements for world 
community, alternative lifestyles and people's liberation con­
tain the promise of a higher order of human being. We can cre­
ate that reality if we do not fear value-venturing. 
DO VALUES CHANGE? NO! VALUES AS A CONSTANT 
by 
David R. Mace 
(Reprinted by permission from Penny ' s Fo rwn, 
Spring, Summer, 1972, p. 17.) 
I find discussion of values as exasperating as discussions 
of love, and for the same reason-because the words have no 
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precise meaning, so that every speaker invests them with mean­
ings of his own. I therefore propose in this article to present 
a conceptual framework that can be understood even by relatively 
young children. It may be philosophically vulnerable, but it is 
pedagogically serviceable. 
In order to think clearly and communicate intelligibly 
about this subject, I find I need to consider my relationships 
to others at three levels-of values, of standards, and of be­
havior. At the top level, clouds in the sky represent values­
they are ethereal and relatively formless. At the next level, 
boxes represent standards-they are rigid and clearly defined. 
At the lower level (down-to-earth) people interacting represent 
behavior. 
These three concepts are normally inter-related. The 
values are the ultimate ideals and goals of mankind, which do 
not undergo basic change. The standards represent the attempts 
of human communities and groups to make rules which will ensure 
that the values are preserved and expressed. Behavior repre­
sents the manner in which individual men and women interact with 
each other, normally by conforming to the standards in order to 
preserve the values. 
Now let us look at each of these three levels a little more 
closely. The values, in my view, do not undergo basic change. 
They are integrally associated with the goals of human life. 
hold that man has evolved beyond the animal level at which first 
survival, then immediate gratification, are the only consciously 
sought goals. The development of the human imagination enables 
man to step out of the narrow confines of the immediate present 
and to contemplate the past and the future. Thus he sees his 
life moving onward and, hopefully, progressing upward. He dreams 
of preserving the goods he has and of gaining greater goods in 
the future. Thus he takes command of his destiny and plans 
ahead. 
But I cannot plan my life on an individual basis. I am 
bound to others who travel with me. They and I stand or fall 
together. So I must work out with the members of my family, 
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tribe, or nation some agreement about our corporate goals. 
This is the process of defining our values. 
In this process, we are not free to follow unfettered imagi­
nation. There are conditions that must be met for mutual sur­
vival. This is even true of the animal world, as Prince Kro­
potkin demonstrated in his Mutual Aid. Unless individuals co-
operate in seeking group ends together, they create conditions in 
which their individual ends are finally defeated. The conditions 
that must be met represent the values. They can be described in 
different ways. Some would say the basic value is justice, other s 
would say it was love. We often speak of beauty, truth and good­
ness as values; and though they may be associated with qualityof 
life rather than with survival, they are valid, because man's goal 
is to do more than survive. 
We can speak of these values in many words, and that doesn't 
matter. The clouds do not need fixed forms. But they are inher­
ently immutable, because they represent the conditions which must 
be met if human communities are not to degenerate or perish. 
We see a good example in microcosm of a human community degener­
ating for lack of values in William Golding's book Lord of the Flies. 
It would be theoretically possible to have a human community 
so dedicated to its values that behavior would not need to be pre­
scribed or controlled, but could be left to individual responsi­
bility. This is the policy prescribed by situation ethics, and 
it can be realized in a really good family and even for a time in 
a larger community. But up to now in human history, there have 
been too many immature and perverse individuals to make it practi­
cable to give th€m total freedom and trust them to live by the 
community values. So it has been necessary to establish standards. 
These are the boxes in our diagram and they represent customs, 
rules, and codes that interpret the correct behavior which will 
lead to the preservation of the values. The boxes have rather 
different shapes in different communities, varying with the cir­
cumstances in which people have to live. The boxes have to be 
rigid in form so that all concerned can see clearly wh3t the law 
is that they have to obey. But in spite of this rigidity, 
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standards are always having to be modified to meet special cases 
and changing circumstances. This is specially true in a time of 
cultural change like that through which we are now passing. Our 
standards today are in confusion. But it is inaccurate to say that 
this means we need no values. It is simply that we are in the 
process of re-interpreting how our immutable values can be most 
effectively reflected in behavior under the new conditions in 
which we are living. , 
The hope of many today is that we may be able, in a free 
and pluralistic society, to dispense with rigid standards and fol­
low the situational mode of living in direct individual re s ponse 
to our ultimate values. This represents a novel and daring exper­
iment. Theoretically, in a world of really mature people, there 
is no reason why this should not be possible. In practice, at 
this stage in human development, the difficulties are formidable. 
DO WE NEED MORAL EDUCATION? 
by 
Ronald G. Helms 
(Reprinted by permission from The Ohio Council for the Social Studies Review, 
Spring 1974.) 
Today we often hear that people are behaving as they do be­
cause of a breakdown in moral values. Some people assume that a 
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lack of religious upbringing is central to the plight of out mis­
guided society. Others reason that our value crisis stems from 
future shock, erosion of family life, cosmopolitan effects of 
mass media, revolution in science and technology, and the com­
plexity of ecological problems. 
While we are not certain about all the causes of increasing 
violence, drug use, and sexual promiscuity in contemporary Ameri­
can society, we are advised by leaders in the field of moral edu­
cation that many people are beset with moral confusion. We are 
advised that many people, young and old, are unaware of their 
moral responsibilities to themselves and to other people. 
But how did we reach this state of moral confusion? Let 
us review some historical origins of traditional value systems 
and see how the systems have broken down. 
Throughout most of history the direction of cultural devel­
opment was often determined by military power, by a church-state 
authoritarianism, or by some other type of entrenched body which 
defined institutions and interpreted the value system. The in­
dividualization, industrialization, and increasing population of 
the twentieth century have tended to diversify culture as well 
as value systems. 
In the past Americans were largely concerned with the incul­
cation of the puritan ethic. In the past we accepted the dual 
tenets that "fear is the mother of morality" and that "morality 
is the rationalization of self-interest." In contrast, today we 
are attempting to eliminate fear from the life of the child; to­
day we often insist that morality should not be limited to self­
interest. 
In a time in which morals were viewed as God-given, immut­
able, and absolute, the morality of children and adults could 
be assumed to be synonymous. In the past we were in relative 
agreement as to the content of these absolute morals, and the 
institutions of home, church, and school were much in agreement 
in the task of transmitting the culture values to the youth. To­
day we find that, although these institutions are still very 
much concerned with teaching morality, the teachings have become 
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more pluralistic. Each institution inculcates in children values 
which may be widely divergent from the values instilled by other 
institutions. This diversity in values training has resulted in 
a peoples harried by confusion and anomie. 
Thus, we have eliminated the absolute aspect of morality, 
the three institutions are no longer in complete concurrence, 
and we have eliminated fear as the basis of morality. Yet, our 
society need not remain in this state of uncertainty. 
Although this moral dilemma readily evidences negative im­
plications for society, there exist positive implications as 
well. For example, people may be forced to reflect upon moral 
issues and thus discover and admit limitations in their ownmoral 
reasoning. After a number of people begin to realize that their 
framework of values is indeed unsteady, it is hoped that portion 
of these will determine that the value system should be bolstered. 
Since we often look to youth for flexibility and to edu­
cators for guidance, perhaps a logical approach to a stable, 
rational system of morals is the development of moral education 
within the existing school curriculum. Educators must face this 
situation and accept their responsibility for providing a method 
of early moral development. 
We should at the outset distinguish between moral education 
and moralistic education. Moralistic education refers to past 
and ongoing practices of instilling, inculcating, and indoctri­
nating a common set of values within children. Moral education 
as we will use the term refers to a process of state-to-stage 
development-a continual process which is learned rather than 
reached automatically. Moralistic education is based upon abso­
lute answers and thus may involve passive acceptance; whereas 
the process of moral education can be stimulated and enriched by 
presenting children with moral dilemmas. Theoretically, through 
the latter process, the child can be assisted toward more mature 
moral reasoning and a better resolution of moral problems. 
In times past the traditional school curriculum utilized 
fables and similar moralistic "lessons" to inculcate "right" 
conduct. The child was trained to recite righteous precepts in 
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the belief that recitation would lead to practice. The school, 
church, and family utilized sermonizing as a method of instilling 
morality. Although this moralization did seem to work, we might 
ask, was the instilling practice itself moral? Moralization 
might seem to guarantee a standard of behavior, but is standard­
ization moral? 
As some people recognize that moralistic education may in­
deed have a constraining effect upon the spirit of the indivi­
dual, they propose that the school system abandon all training 
dealing with morals. However, we must recognize that so long 
as educatiors maintain that their role is one of guidance and 
leadership, valueless teaching will not be possible and therefore 
a morality-free school cannot exist. 
If we conclude that values will permeate the curriculum, 
then surely values education should be based upon the twin con­
cepts of individual moral autonomy and justice. 
The over-riding goal of moral education is that each person 
will be able to independently define his own value structure. 
Moral educators would agree that this is the most important func­
tion of the curriculum. The new morality would emphasize the 
establishment of a system of justice which would promote the 
well-being of the person as an individual. 
This stress on independence and autonomy should not be a 
focal point of confusion. We are not advocating the removal of 
fear in order to substitute the pleasure principle. While we 
I II would not advance a codification of values, we would agree that 
a new "planless ocde'' or a libertine situation would not be any 
more beneficial. 
It is not standardization which we seek, but justice. 
People must be able to, in their own frame of reference, differ­
entiate between their values. Teachers must be prepared to recog­
nize that children come to school with different focal points in 
regard to moral development. And so, in twelve years of school­
ing-even in a traditional curriculum-they will not graduate at 
the same level. Of course, teachers will also be at varying 
levels of moral development. 
48 
Justice, the second of our twin concepts in values educa­
tion, has in the past been derived from arbitrary authority. 
Individuals have either been unwilling to define justice 
for themselves or else they have not been equipped to do so. 
For definition we have in the past turned to authority, to models, 
to special revelation, to faith, or to parental dictate rather 
than to rely upon our own moral reasoning. Teachers today must 
function to give students alternatives in the above ready refer­
ences. Before educators can presume to institute a curriculum 
centering upon the concept of justice, we must recognize that 
justice cannot be taught in an unjust school. As educators we 
need to recognize the injustices of our system. The school is 
most certainly a legal institution; however, a legal system is 
not always a moral system. Our only claim to moral superiority 
is through our commitment to justice. 
For the complicated task of assisting students in moral 
development, there must be some framework of approach. A school 
cannot hope to teach about values or morals simply by offering 
one elective in the senior year; the curriculum K-12 must reflect 
a commitment to moral development. Moral education must be in­
tegrated with reflection, inquiry, and citizenship skills. 
Teachers must develop additional cognitive skills. Adminis­
trators will need to value the systematic research efforts of 
scholars in the field. Finally, schools as social institutions 
must serve as microcosmic models of a just society. 
In contrast, there are many forms of psychotherapy for the 
psychiatrically disturbed. What skilled counsel is there for the 
increasing millions whose problem is not psychiatric, but rather 
a problem of finding meaning in an age that has made the loss of 
purpose a veritable life-style? A theoretical ethics is not 
enough. Given our present moral knowledge and human needs, a 
new discipline of Life Values Education, and particularly of Life 
Values guidance and counseling, is both a possibility and a ne­
cessity. It is this human and social need which I believe human­
istic ethicists must be prepared to serve. Life Values Education 
would enable people to exmine more critically and expertly the 
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logic of their aimless or drifting lives. They would be en­
abled to see more clearly what must be abandoned in their life 
plans, if they are to realize their deeper values and more hu­
manizing goals. 
The same examination must extend to our social morality 
and to the questionable assumptions upon which our industrial and 
commercial systems operate-assumptions that have been newly ex­
posed by the rebellion of youth and the necessity of living with­
in the limits of our human and natural environments. 
We need therefore, to develop a disciplined "value analy­
sis"-or (to coin a term using the Greek prefix for value) an 
"axio-analysis"-of the ways we live and the values, including 
the low and false values which our existing social, psychological 
and economic patterns tend to impose. I do not believe, as many 
do, that our economic and social systems are impervious tochange. 
Certainly we have no right to abandon the task of modifying the 
system to serve human need, when we have hardly begun to develop 
the sciences that could apply that we have already learned about 
how human beings acquire values and structure their personal and 
social goals. These are the practical arts that can help the re­
covery of morale and social vision. 
Certainly a meaningful life-style is not reached by immers­
ing ourselves in drugs, devoting our lives to the acquisition of 
more material wealth than we actually need, nursing the racial 
and ethnic prejudices that fragment human life, retreating be­
hind locked doors while our cities decay and our culture degen­
erates, or waiting for the bomb to fall or revolutionaries to 
strike. These are the ways to ruin. 
Even if our civilization should escape destruction, millions 
of people, by surrendering themselves to moral drift and pur­
poseless existences, would see their lives withered and their 
hopes voided. None of this need be. Enough is known already 
about the requirements for human strength and growth for us to 
construct an applied science of Life Values Education and guid­
ance. The present crisis is ecology, economy, race relations, 
and national goals should teach us that the victories and 
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accomplishments of the next half-century must be radically dif­
ferent from the last; they must be accomplishments of the human 
spirit, fired by a passionate attachment to the future of our one 
human race here on earth. 
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THE TEACHER FACES A DILEMMA: 
A MORAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR STUDENTS 
by 
William E. Collie and Ruth B. Schumacher 
Wrioht State University, Dayton, Ohio 
(Original Article - 1979)
I I 
Moral dilemmas with which students can readily identify have been 
widely used to facilitate moral development. These dilemmas typ­
ically cast students in the central character role and present 
them with real conflicts that raise moral questions. Rarely, if 
ever, however, do dilemmas portray teachers facing moral issues. 
This latter type of dilemma is also appropriate as an educa­
tional strategy and serves additional purposes that the student­
focused dilemma cannot. 
Casting teachers as central characters can help students: 
(1) recognize that teachers, as well as students, face 
problems in decision-making; 
(2) understand that resolving inter-personal concerns 
are part of the teaching p r ocess; 
(3) realize that fulfilling occupational/vocational 
roles involve moral decision-making; and 
(4) realize that moral growth is a developmental, life-
long process. 
To facilitate student identification with this type of dilemma, 
the issue(s) should be student-oriented (e.g. breaking rules, 
cheating). An example of a student-oriented dilemma that por­
trays the teacher as the decision-maker follows. 
Mrs. Kane teaches a senior course in which she utilizes small 
groups and group assignments. At the final, two students in 
group four separately told Mrs. Kane that the group had written 
Jake's name on the last group assignment at his insistence but 
that he actually had not contributed any work at all to the as­
signment. The two remaining members of the group (other than 
Jake) had left the room prior to the statements of the two stu­
dents. Jake had taken the final prior to finals week in order to 
participate in an out-of-town speech tournament. Final semester 
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grades are due before Jake will return to town. 
Mrs. Kane knows she can give Jake an incomplete and contact him 
when he returns to school the following week to discuss the in­
cident. She feels that giving him an incomplete, however, would 
indicate her acceptance of the statements of the two students 
with whom she talked, since her records show no incomplete work 
for Jake. On the other hand, if the accusation is true, Mrs. 
Kane has sympathy for Jake's group because she feels that only 
those students who actually do the group work should receive 
credit. 
Should Mrs. Kane include the last group assignment grade in com­
puting Jake's semester grade? 
If additional information is needed to heighten the dilemma, the 
teacher may choose among the following complicating factors: 
1. The group assignment counts 30% of the semester 
grade. If Jake receives a zero for the group 
assignment, he will fail the course. 
2. Mrs. Kane knows that Jake, a last semester senior, 
must pass this course if he is to have enough credits 
to graduate. 
3. On all other assignments Jake has done his work and 
has given no reason for Mrs. Kane to question his 
ability or his willingness to do the work. 
4. Mrs. Kane knows that the two students who have 
reported that Jake did not do the assigned work 
also are in Jake's speech class. Unlike Jake, 
they were not chosen to participate in the speech 
tournament. 
5. On an earlier class assignment, Jake copied material 
without giving proper credit for the source. 
6. Even if the matter were settled later in Jake's 
favor, issuance now of an incomplete for Jake's 
grade would mean that his name would not appear 
in the graduation program because of printing 
deadlines. 
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THE COGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL 
APPROACH TO MORAL EDUCATION 
by 
Lawrence Kohlberg 
(Reprinted by permission, Phi Delta Kappan, June 1975, 
pp. 670-677.) 
In this article, I present an overview of the cognitive-develop­
mental approach to moral education and its research foundations, 
compare it with other approaches, and report the experimental wor l 
my colleagues and I are doing to apply the approach. 
1. Moral Stages 
The cognitive-developmental approach was fully stated for 
the first time by John Dewey. The approach is called cognitive 
because it recognizes that moral education, like intellectual ed­
ucation, has its basis in stimulating the active thinking of the 
child about moral issues and decisions. It is called develop­
mental because it sees the aims of moral education as movement 
through moral stages. According to Dewey: 
The aim of education is growth or development, both intel­
lectual and moral. Ethical and psychological principles can 
aid the school in the greatest of all constructions-the building of 
-'l free and powerful character. Only knowledge of the order and con­
nection of the stages in psychological development can insure this. 
Education is the work of supplying the conditions which enable the 
psychological functions to mature in the freest and fullest 
manner.l 
Dewey postulated three levels of moral development: 1) 
the pre-moral or preconventional level "of behavior motivated by bio­
logical and social impulses with results for morals," 2) the con­
ventional level of behavior "in which the individual accepts with 
little critical reflection the standards of his group," and 3) 
the autonomous level of behavior in which "conduct is guided by the 
individual thinking and judging for himself whether a purpose is 
good, and does not accept the standard of his group without 
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reflection."* 
Dewey's thinking about moral stages was theoretical. Build­
ing upon his prior studies of cognitive stages, Jean Piaget made 
the first effort to define stages of moral reasoning in children 
through actual interviews and through observations of children 
2(in games with rules) . Using this interview material, Piaget 
def i ned the pre-moral, the conventional, and the autonomous levels 
as follows: 1) the pre-moral stage, where there was no sense of ob-
l igation to rules; 2) the heteronomous stage, where the right was 
literal obedience to rules and an equation of obligation with 
submission to power and punishment (roughly ages 4-8); and 3) the 
autonomous stage, where the purpose and consequences of following 
rules are considered and obligation is based on reciprocity and 
exchange (roughly ages 8-12) .** 
In 1955 I started to redefine and validate (through longi­
tudinal and cross-cultural study) the Dewey-Piaget levels and 
stages. The resulting stages are presented in Table 1. 
We claim to have validated the stages defined in Table 1. 
The notion that stages can be validated by longitudinal study im­
3 plies that stages have definit empirical characteristics. The 
concept of stages (as used by Piaget and myself) implies the fol­
l owing characteristics: 
1. Stages are "structured wholes," or organized systems 
o f thought. Individuals are consistent in level of moral judgment. 
2. Stages form an invariant sequence. Under all conditions 
except extreme trauma, movement is always forward, never backward. 
Individuals never skip stages; movement is always to the next 
s t age up. 
3. Stages are "hierarchical integrations." Thinking at a 
higher stage includes or comprehends within it lower-stage thinking. 
*These levels correspond roughly to our three major levels: 
the preconventional, the conventional, and the principles. Simi­
lar levels were propounded by William McDougall, Leonard Hobhouse, 
and James Mark Baldwin. 
**Piaget's stages correspond to our first three stages: 
St age O (pre-moral), Stage 1 (heteronomous), and Stage 2 ( instru­
mental reciprocity). 
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There is a tendency to function at or prefer the highest stage 
available. 
Each of these characteristics has been demonstrated for 
moral stages. Stages are defined by responses to a set of verbal 
moral dilemmas classified according to an elaborate scoring 
scheme. Validating studies include: 
1. A 20-year study of 50 Chicago-area boys, middle- and 
working-class. Initially interviewed at ages 10-16, they have 
been reinterviewed at three-year intervals thereafter. 
2. A small, six-year longitudinal study of Turkish village 
and city boys of the same age. 
3. A variety of other cross-sectional studies in Canada, 
Britain, Israel, Taiwan, Yucatan, Honduras, and India. 
With regard to the structured whole or consistency criterion, 
we have found that more than 50% of an individual's thinking is 
always at one stage, with the remainder at the next adjacent stage 
(which he is leaving or which he is moving into). 
With regard to invariant sequence, our longitudinal results 
have been presented in the American Journal of Orthopsychiatry (see foot­
note 8), and indicate that on every retest individuals were either 
at the same stage as three years earlier or had moved up. This 
was true in Turkey as well as in the United States. 
With regard to the hierarchical integration criterion, it 
has been demonstrated that adolescents exposed to written state­
ments at each of the six stages comprehend or correctly put in 
their own words all statements at or below their own stage but 
fail to comprehend any statements more than one stage above their 
4 own. Some individuals comprehend the next stage above their 
own; some do not. Adolescents prefer (or rank as best) the high­
est stage they can comprehend. 
Table 1. Definition of Moral Stages 
1. Preconventional level 
At this level, the child is responsive to cultural rules and 
labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels 
either in terms of the physical or the hedonistic consequences 
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of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms of 
the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. 
The level is divided into the following two stages: 
Stage 1: The punishment-and-obedience orientation. The physical 
consequences of action determine its goodness or badness, regard­
less of the human meaning or value of these consequence. Avoid­
ance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power arevalued 
intheir own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral 
order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being 
stage 4). 
Stage 2: The instrumental-relativist orientation. Right action 
consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs 
and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed 
in terms like those of the marketplace. Elements of fairness, of 
reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always 
interpreted in a physical, pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter 
of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, 
gratitude, or justice. 
II. Conventional level 
At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individ­
ual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its 
own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The 
attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations 
and social order, and of identifying with the persons or group in­
volved in it. At this level, there are the following two stages: 
Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good-bo']--nice girl" 
orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others 
and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypi­
cal images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior 
is frequently judged by intention- "he means well" becomes im­
portant for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice." 
Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation 
toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social 
order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing re­
spect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for 
its own sake. 
III. Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level 
At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral 
values and principles that have validity and application apart 
from the authority of the groups or persons holding these princi­
ples and apart from the individual's own identification with these 
groups. This level also has two stages: 
Stage 5: The social-contract, legalistic orientation, generally 
with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in 
terms of general individual rights and standards which have been 
critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There 
is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and 
opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for 
teaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and 
democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal 
"values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis upon the 
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"legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility 
of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social 
utility (rather than freezing it in terms of Stage 4 "law andorder • 
Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the bind­
ing element of obligation. This is the "official" morality of the 
American government and constitution. 
Stage 6: The universal-ethical-principle orientation. Right is 
defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen 
ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, univer­
sality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethi­
cal (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not 
concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these 
are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality o f 
human ri ghts, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as in­
dividual persons ("From is to Ought," pp. 164-165). 
-Reprinted from The Jour nal of Philo sophy, October 25, 1973. 
To understand moral stages, it is important to clarify their 
relations to stage of logic or intelligence, on the one hand, and 
to moral behavior on the other. Maturity of moral judgment is 
not highly correlated with IQ or verbal intelligence (correlations 
are only in the 30's, accounting for 10% of the variance). Cog­
nitive development in the stage sense, however, is more important 
for moral development than such correlations suggest. Piaget has 
found that after the child learns to speak there are three major 
stages of reasoning: the intuitive, the concrete operational, and 
the formal operational. At around age 7, the child enters the 
stage of concrete logical thought: He can make logical inferences, 
classify, and handle quantitative relations about concrete things. 
In adolescence individuals usually enter the stage of formal oper­
ations. At this stage they can reason abstractly, i.e., consider 
all possibilities, form hypotheses, deduce implications from hypo-
theses, and test them against reality. * 
Since moral reasoning clearly is reasoning, advanced moral 
reasoning depends upon advanced logical reasoning: a person's 
*Many adolescents and adults only partially attain the stage 
of formal operations. They do consider all the actual relations 
of one thing to another at the same time, but they do not con­
sider all possibilities and form abstract hypotheses. A few do 
not advance this far, remaining "concrete operational." 
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logical stage puts a certain ceiling on the moral stage he can 
attain. A person whose logical stage is only concrete operational 
is limited to the preconventional moral stages (Stages 1 and 2). 
A person whose logical stage is only partially formal operational 
is limited to the conventional moral stages (Stages 3 and 4). 
While logical development is necessary for moral development and 
sets limits to it, most individuals are higher in logical stage 
than they are in moral stage. As an example, over 50% of late 
adolescents and adults are capable of full formal reasoning, but 
only 10% of these adults (all formal operational) display prin­
cipled (Stages 5 and 6) moral reasoning. 
The moral stages are structures of moral judgment or moral reason­
ing. Structures of moral judgment must be distinguished from the 
contentof moral judgment. As an example, we cite responses to a 
dilemma used in our various studies to identify moral stage. The 
dilemma raises the issue of stealing a drug to save a dying woman. 
The inventor of the drug is selling it for 10 times what it costs 
him to make it. The woman's husband cannot raise the money, and 
the seller refuses to lower the price or wait for payment. What 
should the husband do? 
The choice endorsed by a subject (steal, don't steal) is 
called the content of his moral judgment in the situation. His rea­
soning about the choice defines the structure of his moral judg­
ment. This reasoning centers on the following 10 universal moral 
values or issues of concern to persons in these moral dilemmas: 
1. Punishment 6. Life 
2. Property 7. Liberty 
3. Roles and concerns 8. Distributive justice 
of affection 
9. Truth 
4. Roles and concerns 10. Sexof authority 
5. Law 
A moral choice involves choosing between two (or more) of 
these values as they conflict in concrete situations of choice. 
The stage or structure of a person's moral judgment defines: 
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1) whathe finds valuable in each of these moral issues (life, 
law), i.e., how he defines the value, and 2) why he finds it val­
uable, i.e., the reasons he gives for valuing it. As an example, 
at Stage 1 life is valued in terms of the power or possessions of 
the person involved; at Stage 2, for its usefulness in satisfying 
the needs of the individual in question or others; at Stage 3, in 
terms of the individual's relations with others and their valua­
tiontion of him; at Stage 4, in terms of social or religious law. 
Only at Stages 5 and 6 is each life seen as inherently worthwhile, 
aside from other considerations. 
Moral Judgment Vs. Moral Action 
Having clarified the nature of stages of moraljudgment,we 
must consider the relation of moral judgment to moralaction. If 
logical reasoning is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
mature moral judgment, mature moral judgment is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for mature moral action. One cannot 
follow moral principles if one does not understand (or believe 
in) moral principles. However, one can reason in terms of prin­
ciples. As an example, Richard Krebs and I found that only 15% 
of students showing some principled thinking cheated as compared 
to 55% of conventional subjects and 70% of preconventional sub­
jects.5 Nevertheless, 15% of the principled subjects did cheat, 
suggesting that factors additional to moral judgment are neces­
sary for principled moral reasoning to be translated into "moral 
action." Partly, these factors include the situation and it 
pressures. Partly, what happens depends upon the individual's 
motives and emotions. Partly, what the individual does depends 
upon a general sense of will, purpose or "ego strength." As an 
example of the role of will or ego strength in moral behavior, we 
may cite the study by Krebs: Slightly more than half of his con­
ventional subjects cheated. These subjects were also divided by 
a measure of attention/will. Only 26% of the ''strong-willed" 
conventional subjects cheated; however, 74% of the "weak-willed" 
subjects cheated. 
If maturity of moral reasoning is only one factor in moral 
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behavior, why does the cognitive-developmental approach to moral 
education focus so heavily upon moral reasoning? For the follow­
ing reasons: 
1. Moral judgment, while only one factor in moral behavior, 
is the single most important or influential factor yet discovered 
in moral behavior. 
2. While other factors influence moral behavior, moral judg­
ment is the only distinctively moralfactor in moral behavior. To 
illustrate, we noted that the Krebs study indicated that "strong­
willed" conventional stage subjects resisted cheating more than 
"weak-willed" subjects. For those at a preconventional level of 
moral reasoning, however, "will" had an opposite effect. "Strong­
willed" Stages 1 and 2 subjects cheated more, not less, than 
"weak-willed" subjects, i.e., they had the "courage of their 
(amoral) convictions" that it was worthwhile to cheat. "Will," 
then, is an important factor in moral behavior, but it is not 
distinctively moral; it becomes moral only when informed by mature 
moral judgment. 
3. Moral judgment change is long-range or irreversible; a 
higher stage is never lost. Moral behavior as such is largely 
situational and reversible or "loseable" in new situations. 
II. Aims of Moral and Civic Education 
Moral psychology describes what moral development is, as 
studied empirically. Moral education must also consider moral 
philosophy, which strives to tell us what moral development 
ideally ought to be. Psychology finds an invariant sequence of 
moral stages; moral philosophy must be invoked to answer whether 
a later stage is a better stage. The "stage" of senescence and 
death follows the ''stage" of aulthood, but that does not mean 
that senescence and death are better. Our claim that the latest 
or principled stages of moral reasoning are morally better stages, 
then, must rest on considerations of moral philosophy. 
The tradition of moral philosophy to which we appeal is the 
liberal or rational tradition, in particular the "formalistic" 
61 
or "deontological" tradition running from Immanuel Kant to John 
Rawls. 6 Central to this tradition is the claim that an adequate 
morality is principl2d, i.e., that it makes judgments in terms of 
universal principles applicable to all mankind. Principles are to be 
distinguished from rules, primarily "thou shalt nots" such as are 
represented by the Ten Commandments, prescriptions of kinds of 
actions. Principles are, rather, universal guides to making a 
moral decision. An example is Kant's "categorical imperative," 
formulated in two ways. The first is the maxim of respect for 
human personality, "Act always toward the other as an end, not 
as a means." The second is the maxim of universalization, "Choose 
only as you would be willing to have everyone choose in your situ­
ation." Principles like that of Kant's state the formal condi-
tions of a moral choice or action. In the dilemma in which a 
woman is dying because a druggist refuses to release his drug for 
less than the stated price, the druggist is not acting morally, 
though he is not violating the ordinary moral rules (he is not 
actually stealing or murdering). But he is violating principles: 
He is treating the woman simply as a means to his ends of profit, 
and he is not choosing as he would wish anyone to choose (if the 
druggist were in the dying woman's place, he would not want a 
druggist to choose as he is choosing). Under most circumstances, 
choice in terms of conventional moral rules and choice in terms 
of principles coincide. Ordinarily principles dictate not steal­
ing (avoiding stealing is implied by acting in terms of a regard 
for others as ends and in terms of what one would want everyone 
to do). In a situation where stealing is the only means to save 
a life, however, principles contradict the ordinary rules and 
would dictate stealing. Unlike rules which are supported by 
social authority, principles are freely chosen by the individual 
because of their intrinsic moral validity.* 
The conception that a moral choice is a choice made in 
terms of moral principles is related to the claim of liberal moral 
*Not~ll freely chosen values or rules are principles, how­
ever, Hitler chose the "rule," exterminate the enemies of the Aryan 
race," but such a rule is not a universalizable principle. 
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philosophy that moral principles are ultimately principles of 
justice. In essence, moral conflicts are conflicts between the 
claims of persons, and principles for resolving these claims are 
principles of justice, "for giving each his due." Central to jus­
tice are the demands of liberty, equality, and reciprocity. At every 
moral stage, there is a concern for justice. The most damning 
statement a school child can make about a teacher is that "he's 
not fair." At each higher stage, however, the conception of 
justice is reorganized. At Stage 1, justice is punishing the bad 
in terms of "an eye-for-an-eye and a tooth-for-a-tooth." At 
Stage 2, it is exchanging favors and goods in an equal manner. At 
Stages 3 and 4, it is treating people as they desire in terms of 
the conventional rules. At Stage S, it is recognized that all 
rules and laws flow from justice, from a social contract between 
the governors and the governed designed to protect the equal 
rights of all. At Stage 6, personally chosen moral principles 
are also principles of justice, the principles any member of a 
society would choose for that society if he did not know what his 
position was to be in the society and in which he might be the 
7least advantaged. Principles chosen from this point of view are, 
first, the maximum liberty compatible with the like liberty of 
others and, second, no inequalities of goods and respect which 
are not to the benefit of all, including the least advantaged. 
As an example of stage progression in the orientation to 
8justice, we may take judgments about capital punishment. Capi­
tal punishment is only firmly rejected at the two principled 
stages, when the notion of justice as vengeance or retribution is 
abandoned. At the sixth stage, capital punishment is not condoned 
even if it may have some useful deterrent effect in promoting law 
and order. This is because it is not a punishment we would 
choose for a society if we assumed we had as much chance of being 
born into the position of a criminal or murderer as being born 
into the position of a law abider. 
We are decisions based on universal principles of justice 
better decisions? Because they are decisions on which all moral 
men could agree. When decisions are based on conventional moral 
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rules, men will disagree, since they adhere to conflicting systems 
of rules dependent on culture and social position. Throughout 
history men have killed one another in the name of conflicting 
moral rules and values, most recently in Vietnam and the Middle 
East. Truly morla or just resolutions of conflicts require prin­
ciples which are, or can be, universalizable. 
Alternative Approaches 
We have given a philosophic rationale for stage advance as 
the aim of moral education. Given this rationale, the develop­
mental approach to moral education can avoid the problems in­
herent in the other two major approaches to moral education. The 
first alternative approach is that of indoctrinative moral edu­
cation, the preaching and imposition of the rules and values of 
the teacher and his culture on the child. In America, when this 
indoctrinative approach has been developed in a systematic manner, 
it has usually been termed "character education." 
Moral values, in the character education approach, are 
preached or taught in terms of what may be called the "bag of vir­
tues." In the classic studies of character by Hugh Hartshorne and 
Mark May, the virtues chosen were honesty, service, and self­
control.9 It is easy to get superficial consensus on such a bag 
of virtues-until one examines in detail the list of virtues in­
volved and the details of their definition. Is the Hartshorne 
and May bag more adequate than the Boy Scout bag (a Scout should 
be honest, loyal, reverent, clean, brave, etc.)? When one turns 
to the details of defining each virtue, one finds equal uncer­
tainty or difficulty in reaching consensus. Does honesty mean 
one should not steal to save a life? Does it mean that a student 
should not help another student with his homework? 
Character education and other forms of indoctrinative moral 
education have aimed at teaching universal values (it is assumed 
that honesty or service are desirable traits for all men in all 
societies), but the detailed definitions used are relative; 
they are defined by the opinions of the teacher and the conven­
tional culture and rest on the authority of the teacher for their 
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justification. In this sense character education is close to the 
unreflective valuings by teachers which constitute the hidden cur­
riculum of the school.* Because of the current unpopularity of 
indoctrinative approaches to moral education, a family of ap­
proaches called "values clarification" has become appealing to 
teachers. Values clarification takes the first step implied by a 
rational approach to moral education: the eliciting of thechild's 
own judgment or opinion about issues or situations in which values 
conflict, rather than imposing the teacher's opinion on him. 
Values clarification, however, does not attempt to go further 
than eliciting awareness of values' it is assumed that becoming 
more self-aware about one's values is an end in itself. Funda­
mentally, the definition of the end of values education as self­
awareness derives from a belief in ethical relativity held by 
many value-clarifiers. As stated by Peter Engel, "One must con­
trast value clarification and value inculcation. Value clarifi­
cation implies the principle that in the consideration of values 
there is no single correct answer." Within these premises of 
"no correct answer," children are to discuss moral dilemmas in 
such a way as to reveal different values and discuss their value 
differences with each other. The teacher is to stress that "our 
values are different," not that one value is more adquate than 
others. If this program is systematically followed, students will 
themselves become relativists, elieving there is no "right" moral 
answer. For instance, a student caught cheating might argue that 
he did nothing wrong, since his own hierarchy of values, which 
may be different from that of the teacher, made it right for him 
to cheat. 
Like values clarification, the cognitive developmental ap­
proach to moral education stresses open or Socratic peer dis­
cussion of value dilemmas. Such discussion, however, has an aim: 
*As an example of the "hidden curriculum," we may cite a 
second-grade classroom. My son came home from this classroom one 
day saying he did not want to be "one of the bad boys." Asked 
"Who are the bad boys?" he replied, "The ones who don't put their 
books back and get yelled at." 
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stimulation of movement to the next stage of moral reasoning. 
Like values clarification, the developmental approach opposes 
indoctrination. Stimulation of movement to the next stage of 
reasoning is not indoctrinative, for the following reasons: 
1. Change is in the way of reasoning rather than in the 
particular beliefs involved. 
2. Students in a class are at different stages; the aim is 
to aid movement of each to the next stage, not convergence on a 
common patterns. 
3. The teacher's own opinion is neither stressed nor invoked 
as authoritative. It enters in only as one of many opinions, 
hopefully one of those at a next higher stage. 
4. The notion that some judgments are more adequate than 
others is communicated. Fundamentally, however, this means that 
the student is encouraged to articulate a position which seems 
most adequate to him and to judge the adequacy of the reasoning 
of others. 
In addition to having more definite aims than values 
clarification, the moral development approach restricts value ed­
ucation to that which is moral or, more specifically, to justice. 
This is for two reasons. First, it is not clear that the whole 
realm of personal, political, and religious values is a realm 
which is nonrelative, i.e., in which there are universals and a 
direction of development. Second, it is not clear that the pub­
lic school has a right or mandate to develop values in general.* 
In our view, value education in the public schools should be re­
stricted to that which the school has the right and mandate to 
*Restriction of deliberate value education to the moral 
may be clarified by our example of the second-grade teacher who 
made tidying up of books a matter of moral indoctrination. 
Tidiness is a value, but it is not a moral value. Cheating is a 
moral issue, intrinsically one of fairness. It involves issues 
of violation of trust and taking advantage. Failing to tidy the 
room may under certain conditions be an issue of fairness, when 
it puts an undue burden on others. If it is handled by the 
teacher as a matter of cooperation among the group in this sense, 
it is a legitimate focus of deliberate moral education. If it 
is not, it simply represents the arbitrary imposition of the 
teacher's values on the child. 
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develop: an awareness of justice, or of the rights of others in 
our Constitutional system. While the Bill of Rights prohibits the 
t eaching of religious beliefs, or of specific value systems, it 
does not prohibit the teaching of the awareness of rights and 
principles of justice fundamental to the Constitution itself. 
When moral education is recognized as centered in justice 
and differentiated from value education or affective education, 
i t becomes apparent that moral and civic education are much the 
same thing. This equation, taken for granted by the classic phil­
osophers of education from Plato and Aristotle to Dewey, is basic 
t o our claim that a concern for moral education is central to the 
educational objectives of social studies. 
The term civic education is used to refer to social studies 
as more than the study of the facts and concepts of social sci­
ence, history, and civics. It is education for the analytic un­
derstanding, value principles, and motivation necessary for a 
citizen in a democracy if democracy is to be an effective pro­
cess. It is political education. Civic or political education 
means the stimulation of development of more advanced patterns of 
reasoning about political and social decisions and their imple­
mentation in action. These patterns are patterns of moral rea­
soning. Our studies show that reasoning and decision-making 
about political decisions are directly derivative of broader pat­
terns of moral reasoning and decision making. We have interviewed 
high school and college students about concrete political situa­
tions involving laws to govern open housing, civil disobedience 
for peace in Vietnam, free press rights ot publish what might 
disturb national order, and distribution of income through taxa­
tion. We find that reasoning on these political decisions can be 
classified according to moral stage and that an individual's 
stage on political dilemmas is at the same level as on nonpoliti­
cal moral dilemmas (euthanasia, violating authority to maintain 
trust in a family, stealing a drug to save one's dying wife). 
Turning from reasoning to action, similar findings are obtained. 
In 1963 a study was made of those who sat in at the University of 
California, Berkeley, administration building and those who did 
not in the Free Speech Movement crisis. Of those at Stage 6, 80% 
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sat in, believing that principles of free speech were being com­
promised, and that all efforts to compromise and negotiate with 
the administration had failed. In contrast, only 15% of the con-
ventional (Stage 3 or Stage 4) subjects sat in. (Stage 5 subjects 
were in between.)* 
From a psychological side, then, political development is 
part of moral development. The same is true from the philosophic 
side. In the Republic , Plato sees political education as part of 
a broader education for moral justice and finds a rationale for 
such education in terms of universal philosophic principles rather 
than the demands of a particular society. More recentl y , Dewey 
claims the same . 
In historical perspective, America was the first nation 
whose government was publicly founded on post-conventional prin­
ciples of justice, rather than upon the authority central to con­
ventional moral reasoning. At the time of our founding, post­
conventional or principled moral and political reasoning was the 
possession of the minority , as it still is. Today, as in the time 
of our founding, the majority of our adults are at the conventiona l 
level, particularly the "law and order" (fourth) moral stage. 
(Svery few years the Gallup Poll circulates the Bill of Rights 
unidentified, and every year it is turned down.) The Founding 
Fathers intuitively understood this without benefit of our elab­
orate social science research; the y constructed a document design­
ing a government which would maintain principles of justice and 
the rights of man even though principled men were not the men in 
power. The machinery included checks and balances, the indepen­
dent judiciar y , and freedom of the press. Most recently, this 
machinery found its use at Watergate. The tragedy of Richard 
Nixon, as Harry Truman said long ago, was that he never understood 
*The differential action of the principled subjects was de­
termined by two things: First, they were more likely to judge it 
right to violate authority by sitting in. But second, they were 
also in general more consistent in engaging in political action 
according to their judgment. Ninety percent of all Stage 6 sub­
jects thought it right to sit in, and all 90 % lived up to this 
belief. Among the Stage 4 subjects, 45 % thought it right to sit 
in, but only 33 % lived up to this belief by acting. 
68 
the Constitution (a Stage 5 document), but the Constitution 
understood Richard Nixon. *
Watergate, then, is not some sign of moral decay of the 
nation, but rather of the fact that understanding and action in 
s upport of justice principles are still the possession of a 
minority of our society. Insofar as there is moral decay, it 
represents the weakening of conventional morality in the face of 
s ocial and value conflict today. This can lead the less fortunate 
adolescent to fixation at the preconventional level, the more 
f ortunate to movement to principles. We find a larger propor­
tion of youths at the principled level today than was the case in 
1-
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t heir fathers' day, but also a larger proportion at the precon­
ve ntional level. 
Given this state, moral and civic education in the schools 
becomes a more urgent task. In the high school today, one often 
hears both preconventional adolescents and those beginning to 
move beyond convention sounding the same note of disaffection for 
t he school While our political institutions are in principle 
Stage 5 (i.e., vehicles for maintaining universal rights through 
the democratic process), our schools have traditionally been 
Stage 4 institutions of convention and authority. Today more 
than ever, democratic schools systematically engaged in civic edu­
c ation are required. 
Our approach to moral and civic education relates the study 
of law- and government to the actual creation of a democratic 
school in which moral dilemmas are discussed and resolved in a 
manner which will stimulate moral development. 
Planned Moral Education 
For many years, moral development was held by psychologists 
to be primarily a result of family upbringing and family condi-
tions. In particular, conditions of affection and authority in 
*No public or private word or deed of Nixon ever rose above 
Stage 4, the "law and order" stage. His last comments in the 
White House were of wonderment that the Republican Congress could 
turn on him after so many Stage 2 exchanges of favors in getting 
them elected. 
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the home were believed to be critical, some balance of warmth 
and firmness being optional for moral development. This view 
arises if morality is conceived as an internalization of the ar­
bitrary rules of parents and culture, since such acceptance must 
be based on affection and respect for parents as authorities 
rather than on the rational nature of the rules involved. 
Studies of family correlates of moral stage development 
do not support this internalization view of the conditions for 
moral development. Instead, they suggest that the conditions 
for moral development in homes and schools are similar and that 
the conditions are consistent with cognitive-developmental theory. 
In the cognitive-developmental view, morality is a natural pro­
duct of a universal human tendency toward empathy or role taking, 
toward putting oneself in the shoes of other conscious beings. 
It is also a product of a universal human concern for justice, 
for reciprocity or equality in the relation of one person to an­
other. As an example, when my son was 4, he became a morally 
principled vegetarian and refused to eat meat, resisting all 
parental persuasion to increase his protein intake. His reason 
was "It's bad to kill animals." His moral commitment to vege­
tarianism was not taught or acquired from parental authority: it 
was the result of the universal tendency of the young self to 
project its consciousness and values into other living things, 
other selves. My son's vegetarianism also involved a sense of 
justice, revealed when I read him a book about Eskomos in which a 
rea! hunting expedition was described. His response was to say, 
"Daddy, there is one kind of meat I would eat - Eskimo meat. 
It's all right to eat Eskimos because they eat animals." This 
natural sense of justice or reciprocity was Stage 1 - an eye-for­
an-eye, a tooth-for-a-tooth. My son's sense of the value of 
life was also Stage 1 and involved no differentiation between 
human personality and physical life. His morality, though Stage 
1, was, however, natural and internal. Moral development past 
Stage 1, then, is not an internalization but the reconstruction 
of role taking and conceptions of justice toward greater adequacy. 
These reconstructions occur in order to achieve a better match 
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between the child's own moral structures and the structures of 
the social and moral situations he confronts. We divide these 
conditions of match into two kinds: those dealing with moral 
discussions and communication and those dealing with the total 
moral environment or atmosphere in which the child lives. 
In terms of moral discussion, the important conditions 
appear to be: 
1. Exposure to the next higher stage of reasoning 
2. Exposure to situations posing problems and contradic­
tions for the child's current moral structure, leading to dis­
satisfaction with his current level 
3. An atmosphere of interchange and dialogue combining the 
first two conditions, in which conflicting moral views are com­
pared in an open manner. 
Studies of families in India and America suggest that mor­
ally advanced children have parents at higher stages. Parents 
expose children to the next higher stage, raising moral issues 
. d. 1 ' b · and engaging. in open 1a ague or 1nter-ch ange a out sueh issues. lO 
Drawing on this notion of the discussion conditions stimu­
lating advance, Moshe Blatt conducted classroom discussions of 
conflict-laden hypothetical moral dilemmas with four classes of 
11junior high and high school students for a semester. In each 
of these classes, students were to be found at three stages. 
Since the children were not all responding at the same stage, 
the ar~uments they used with each other were at different levels. 
In the course of these discussions among the students, the teacher 
first supported and clarified those arguments that were one 
stage above the lowest stage among the children; for example, the 
teacher supported Stage 3 rather than Stage 2. When it seemed 
that these arguments were understood by the students, the teacher 
then challenged that stage, using new situations, and clarified 
the arguments one stage above the previous one: Stage 4 rather 
than Stage 3. At the end of the semester, all the students were 
retested; they showed significant upward change when compared to 
the controls, and they maintained the change one year later. In 
the experimental classrooms, from one-fourth to one-half of the 
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students moved up a stage, while there was essentially no change 
during the course of the experiment in the control group. 
Given the Blatt studies showing that moral discussion could 
raise moral stage, we undertook the next step: to see if teachers 
could conduct moral discussions in the course of teaching high 
school social studies with the same results. This step we took 
in cooperation with Edwin Fenton, who introduced moral dilemmas 
in his nith-and eleventh-grade social studies texts. Twenty-four 
teachers in the Boston and Pittsburgh areas were given some in­
struction in conducting moral discussions around the dilemmas in 
the text. About half of the teachers stimulated significant de­
velopmental change in their classroom - upward stage movement of 
one-quarter to one-half a stage. In control classes using the 
text but no moral dilemma discussions, the same teachers failed 
to stimulate any moral change in the students. Moral discussion, 
then, can be a usable and effective part of the curriculum at 
grade level. Working with filmstrip dilemmas produced in coop­
eration with Guidance Associates, second-grade teachers conducted 
moral discussions yielding a similar amount of moral stage move­
ment. 
Moral discussion and curriculum, however, constitute only 
one portion of the conditions stimulating moral growth. When we 
turn to analyzing the broader life environment, we turn to a con­
sideration of the moral atmosphere of the home, the school, and 
the broader society. The first basic dimension of social atmos­
phere is the role-taking opportunities it provides, the extent 
to which it encourages the child to take the point of view of 
others. Role taking is related to the amount of social inter­
action and social communication in which the child engages, as 
well as to his sense of efficacy in influencing attitudes of 
others. The second dimension of social atmosphere, more strictly 
moral, is the level of justice of the environment or institution. 
The justice structure of an institution refers to the perceived 
rules or principles for distributing rewards, punishments, re­
sponsibilities, and privileges among institutional members. This 
structure may exist or be perceived at any of our moral stages. 
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As an example, a study of a traditional prison revealed that in­
12mates perceived it as Stage 1, regardless of their own levei. 
Obedience to arbitrary command by power figures and punishment 
for disobedience were seen as the governing justice norms of the 
prison. A behavior-modification prison using point rewards for 
conformity was perceived as a Stage 2 system of instrumental ex­
change. Inmates at Stage 3 or 4 perceived this institution as 
more fair than the traditional prison, but not as fair in their 
own terms. 
These and other studies suggest that a higher level of in­
stitutional justice is a condition for individual development of 
a higher sense of justice. Working on these premises, Joseph 
Hickey, Peter Scharf, and I worked with guards and inmates in a 
13women's prison to create a more just community. A social con­
tract was set up in which guards and inmates each had a vote of 
one and in which rules were made and conflicts resolved through 
discussions of fairness and a democratic vote in a communitymeet­
ing. The program has been operating four years and has stimu­
lated moral stage advance in inmates, though it is still too 
early to draw conclusions as to its overall long-range effec­
tiveness for rehabilitation. 
One year ago, Fenton, Ralph Mosher, and I received a grant 
from the Danforth Foundation (with additional support from the 
Kennedy Foundation) to make moral education a living matter in 
two high schools in the Boston area (Cambridge and Brookline) 
and two in Pittsburgh. The plan was training counselors and 
social studies and English teachers in conducting moral dis­
cussions and making moral discussion an integral part of the cur­
riculum. The second was establishing a just community school 
within a public high school. 
We have stated the theory of the just community high school, 
postulating that discussing real-life moral situations and ac­
tions as issues of fairness and as matters for democratic deci­
sion would stimulate advance in both moral reasoning and moral 
action. A participatory democracy provides more extensive oppor­
tunities for role taking and a higher level of perceived 
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institutional justice than does any other social arrangement. 
Most alternative schools strive to establish a democratic gov­
ernance, but none we have observed has achieved a vital or viable 
participatory democracy. Our theory suggested reasons why we 
might succeed where others failed. First, we felt that democracy 
had to be a central commitment of a school, rather than a humani­
tarian frill. Democracy as moral education provides that commit­
ment. Second, democracy in alternative schools often fails be­
cause it bores the students. Students prefer to let teachers 
make decisions about staff, courses, and schedules, rather than 
to attend lengthy, complicated meetings. Our theory said that 
the issues a democracy should focus on are issues of morality and 
fairness. Real issues concerning drugs, stealing, disruptions, 
and grading are never boring if handled as issues of fairness. 
Third, our theory told us that if large democratic community meet­
ings were preceded by small-group moral discussion, higher-stage 
thinking by students would win out in later decisions, avoiding 
the disasters of mob rule. * 
Currently, we can report that the school based on our theor y 
makes democracy work or function where other schools have failed. 
It is too early to make any claims for its effectiveness in caus­
ing moral development, however. 
Our Cambridge just community school within the public high 
school was started after a small summer planning session of vol­
unteer teachers, students, and parents. At the time the school 
opened in the fall, only a commitment to democracy and a skele­
ton program of English and Social Studies had been decided on. 
The school started with six teachers from the regular school and 
60 students, 20 from academic professional homes and 20 from 
*An example of the need for small-group discussion comes 
from an alternative school community meeting called because a 
pair of the students had stolen the school's video-recorder. The 
resulting majority decision was that the school should buy back 
the recorder from the culprits through a fence. The teachers 
could not accept this decision and returned to a more authorita­
tive approach. I believe if the moral reasoning of students urg­
ing this solution had been confronted by students at a higher 
stage, a different decision would have emerged. 
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working-class homes. The other 20 were dropouts and trouble­
makers or petty delinquents in terms of previous record. The 
usual mistakes and usual chaos of a beginning alternative school 
ensued. Within a few weeks, however, a successful democratic 
community process had been established. Rules were made around 
pressing issues: disturbances, drugs, hooking. A student dis­
cipline committee or jury was formed. The resulting rules and 
enforcement have been relatively effective and reasonable. We do 
not see reasonable rules as ends in themselves, however, but as 
vehicles for moral discussion and an emerging sense of community. 
This sense of community and a resulting morale are perhaps the 
most immediate signs of success. This sense of community seems 
to lead to behavior change of a positive sort. An example is a 
15-year-old student who started as one of the greatest combina­
tions of humor, aggression, light-fingeredness, and hyperactivity 
I have ever know. From being the principal disturber of all com­
munity meetings, he has become an excellent community meeting par­
ticipant and occasional chairman. He is still more ready to en­
force rules for others than to observe them himself, yet his com­
mitment to the school has led to a steady decrease in exotic be­
havior. In addition, he has become more involved in classes and 
projects and has begun to listen and ask questions in order to 
pursue a line of interest. 
We attribute such behavior change not only to peer pressure 
and mo-ral discussion but to the sense of community which has 
emerged from the democratic process in which angry conflicts are 
resolved through fairness and community decision. This sense of 
community is reflected in statements of the students to us that 
there are no cliques-that the blacks and the whites, the pro­
fessors' sons and the project students, are friends. These state­
ments are supported by observation. Such a sense of community is 
needed where students in a given classroom range in reading level 
fromfifth-grade to college. 
Fenton, Mosher, the Cambridge and Brookline teachers, and I 
are now planning a four-year curriculum in English and Social 
Studies centering on moral discussion, on role taking and 
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communication, and on relating the government, laws, and justice 
system of the school to that of the American society and other 
world societies . This will integrate an intellectual curriculum 
for a higher level of understanding of society with the experien­
tial components of school democracy and moral decisions. 
There is very little new in this-or in anything else we 
are doing. Dewey wanted democratic experimental schools for 
moral and intellectual development 70 years ago. Perhaps Dewey's 
time has come. 
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A REPLY TO KOHLBERG 
by 
Richards. Peters 
(Reprinted by permission, Phi Delta Kappan, June 1975, p. 678.) 
Someone said of Bernard Shaw that he was like the Venus de 
Milo. What there was of him was excellent. The same, I think, 
needs to be said of Kohlberg. The trouble is, however, that 
Kohlberg remains quite impervious to criticisms of the limitations 
of his view of moral education. He has never answered, for in­
stance, a series of very constructive criticisms leveled against 
him by myself and Bill Alston in the Binghampton conference of 
1
1969. It is not that the stuff he continues to ladle out is not 
2 
very good. It is, and I have made much use of it myself. It is 
simply that he remains oblivious of the many other important as­
pects of moral education, and there is a danger that the unwary 
will think that he has told the whole story. In a commentary of 
this length, I can only list the main omissions: 
1. He suffers from the rather touching belief that a 
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Kantian type of morality, represented in modern times most 
notably by Hare and Rawls, is the only one. 3 He fails to grasp 
that utilitarianism, in which the principle of justice is prob­
lematic, is an alternative type of morality and that people such 
as Winch have put forward a morality of integrity in which the 
principle of universalizability is problematic. 4 I think this 
can be carried forward, actually. A morality of courage as exem­
plified by train robbers, the old "virtue" of Machiavelli's Prin ce 
is a defensible morality. So also is a more romantic type of 
morality such as that of D.H. Lawrence, in which trust must be 
placed in "the dark God within.'' It is either sheer legislation 
to say that Kohlberg's morality is the true one, or it is the 
worst from of the naturalistic fallacy which argues from how "mor­
ality" is ordinarily used to what morality is. 
2. He does not take "good-boy" morality seriously enough 
either from a practical or from a theoretical point of view. 
Practically-speaking, since few are likely to emerge beyond Kohl­
berg's Stages 3 and 4, it is important that our fellow citizens 
should be well bedded down at one or the other of these stages. 
The policeman cannot always be present, and if I am lying in the 
gutter after being robbed it is somewhat otiose to speculate at 
what stage the mugger is. My regret must surely be that he had 
not at least got a conventional morality well instilled in him. 
Theoretically, too, the good-boy stage is crucial; for at this 
stage the child learns from the inside, as it were, what it is 
to follow a rule. Unless he has learned this well (whatever it 
means!), the notion of following his own rules at the autonomous 
stage is unintelligible. Kohlberg does not appreciate, either, 
that moral rules have to be learned in the face of counter­
inclinations. Otherwise there would, in general, be no point to 
them. Hence the necessity at these stages for the type of rein­
forcement advocated by Skinner and others and for the modeling 
processes so stressed by Bronfenbrenner in his Two Worlds of 
Childhood. 5 In particular, he ignores the masterly chapter 
on "The Unmaking of the American Child." He seems sublimely una­
ware, too, of the mass of evidence about other aspects of moral 
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education collected by Hoffman in Mussen' s Carmichael's Manual of 
6
Child Psychology. 
73. As Bill Alston stresses in his article and I stress 
elsewhere, Kohlberg, like Piaget, is particularly weak on the 
development of the affective side of morality, of moral amotions 
such as "guilt," "concern for others," "remorse," and so on. 
4. Finally, Kohlberg, in his references to ego strength, 
sees the importance of will in morality, but offers no account of 
the type of habit training which encourages or discourages its 
8 growth. 
I and others have written a great deal about these other 
aspects of morality and moral learning and development, it is a 
pity that Lawrence Kohlberg does not start doing some homework! 
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